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Abstract
For several decades, American corporate scholars assumed the inevitability of the widely held Berle and
Means' corporation. The argument was simple. In a rapidly developing industrial economy, economic
prosperity dictated the infusion of massive amounts of capital into owner-managed corporations. Without
ample capital, entrepreneurs would be unable to realize the scale economies or technological innovations
necessary for industrial growth. The rub in the story, however, was that to raise the necessary capital, owner-
managers had to sell off equity interests. Inevitably, the pressure for capital meant that ownership ended up
being dispersed among numerous small stakes shareholders. With ownership fractured, sundry collective
action problems subverted the capacity of shareholders to wield effective control over their managerial agents,
which, in tum, meant efficiency losses from sub-optimal resource utilization.
Recently, however, recognition of the survival of concentrated share ownership corporations in other
countries, namely Germany and Japan and even in the United States, has caused American scholars to
reconsider their commitment to the evolutionary inevitability of the Berle and Means' corporation. No longer
the byproduct of innate economic forces, the American corporation has of late been viewed by many as
merely path dependent, more particularly the result of a confluence of political, historical and cultural factors.
Perhaps the most important was the restriction barring financial intermediaries from holding or voting
ownership interests in commercial companies. Had these barriers not been created, ownership may have come
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TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT:
THE ROLE OF THE CLOSELY HELD PUBLIC
CORPORATION IN THE CANADIAN ECONOMY AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Ronald}. Daniels and Paul Halpern *
I. INTRODUCTION
For several decades, American corporate scholars assumed the
inevitability of the widely held Berle and Means' corporation.!
The argument was simple. In a rapidly developing industrial
economy, economic prosperity dictated the infusion of massive
amounts of capital into owner-managed corporations. Without
ample capital, entrepreneurs would be unable to realize the scale
economies or technological innovations necessary for industrial
growth. The rub in the story, however, was that to raise the
necessary capital, owner-managers had to sell off equity interests.
Inevitably, the pressure for capital meant that ownership ended up
being dispersed among numerous small stakes shareholders. With
ownership fractured, sundry collective action problems subverted
the capacity of shareholders to wield effective control over their
managerial agents, which, in tum, meant efficiency losses from
sub-optimal resource utilization.
Recently, however, recognition of the survival of concentrated
share ownership corporations in other countries, namely
Germany and Japan and even in the United States, has caused
American scholars to reconsider their commitment to the evolu-
tionary inevitability of the Berle and Means' corporation.2 No
• Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, and Faculty of Management, University of
Toronto, respectively. We acknowledge the able research assistance of Kelly Friedman,
an associate at the law firm of Goodman Phillips & Vineberg, and of Wayne Bigby, third-
year student of the Faculty of Law. We also appreciate the secretarial assistance of Pia
Bruni in preparing this article. Finally, Jonathan Macey ofthe Cornell Law School and Ed
Waitzer, Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, provided thoughtful comments on
an earlier draft ofthis article.
I Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New
York, MacMillan, 1933).
2 M. Roe, "Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies"
11
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longer the byproduct of innate economic forces, the American
corporation has of late been viewed by many as merely path
dependent, more particularly the result of a confluence of
political, historical and cultural factors. Perhaps the most
important was the restriction barring financial intermediaries from
holding or voting ownership interests in commercial companies.
Had these barriers not been created, ownership may have come to
reside in sophisticated large stakes shareholders, who were much
more likely than retail investors to control managerial agents.
Nevertheless, however intellectually exhilarating the American
debate over corporate governance, it has always had a slightly
sterile quality to the Canadian ear. Unlike its American
counterpart, the concentrated share ownership structure of the
Canadian corporation has proven itself much more resilient to the
pressures of industrialization. Whereas the widely held corpo-
ration has long been the norm in the United States, it has only
been the exception in Canada. 3 Moreover, high levels of share
ownership concentration were able to flourish in Canada despite
the fact that Canadian financial intermediaries never made major
investments in corporate equities.
Yet, instead of celebrating the capacity of Canadian share-
holders to ensure the fidelity of their managerial agents through
ownership, several Canadian commentators have adopted a
decidedly more ambivalent view of the merits of high share
ownership concentration. 4 The concern is that ownership has not
led to demonstrable gains in the performance of Canadian firms,
and, in many cases, may have facilitated intra-shareholder redis-
tributions of wealth.
In this article, we explore the effect of share ownership concen-
tration on corporate performance in Canada from a law and
(1990), 27 Journal of Finance 7, and "A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance" (1991), 91 Col. L. Rev. 10; Joseph Grundfest, "Subordination of American
Capital" (1990),27 Journal of Finance 89.
3 In 1990, for instance, only 14% of the companies in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 were
widely held in contrast to 63% of the companies in the United States' Fortune 500. Of the
remainder, 60.3% are owned by a single shareholder with legal control (greater than 50%
of voting shares), 25.4% by one shareholder with effective control (20 to 49.9% of voting
shares) or by two or three shareholders having the ability to combine and establish joint
legal or effective control. See Ronald Daniels and Jeffrey Macintosh, "Toward A
Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime" (1991),29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 863 at p. 884.
4 Daniels and Macintosh, ibid. For a popular account, see Diane Francis, Controlling
Interests. Who Owns Canada? (Toronto, Macmillan, 1986).
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finance perspective. In Part II, we array the different and
competing incentive effects of share ownership on firm value, with
reference to the empirical literature. On the basis of this liter-
ature, we argue that while widely held companies pose obvious
and well known accountability problems for shareholders, there
are also severe accountability problems manifest to some degree
in closely-held public corporations. We review the empirical liter-
ature investigating the relationship of ownership value and firm
structure, and find that among closely-held public companies,
these problems are most acute for managing shareholders who are
either aging entrepreneurs or second generation heirs. We argue
that for these corporations, the ability to extract non-pecuniary
benefits from control may make these shareholders reluctant to
surrender control, even if doing so generates tangible increases in
economic wealth for the controller. This commitment is
explained, in part, by the relatively low levels of utility that high
income individuals derive from marginal increases in wealth, in
contrast to non-pecuniary benefits derived from control itself, and
to endowment effects.
We argue that certain efficiency gains could be realized by
encouraging these large block holders either to take their
companies private or to sell a large portion of their voting stock to
other shareholders, ideally specialist monitors. In Part III, we
speculate on why the Canadian economy has sustained high and
durable ownership levels, implicating a number of disparate
factors. In Part IV, we argue that for many types of closely-held
Canadian corporations, trade and investment liberalization is
unleashing powerful market forces that will promote the transfor-
mation of some closely held public companies to either private
companies or deconcentrated public companies. Nevertheless, for
the reasons alluded to above, individual or family controlled
companies, especially those with dual class structures, are likely to
be less susceptible to these pressures - at least in the short run-
and we express concern about the efficiency losses from delayed
de-concentration. In Part V, we canvass several different policy
options for addressing majority-minority shareholder conflicts in
the context of these laggard companies.
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II. THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP CONTROL ON FIRM VALUE
1• Convergence and Entrenchment
BerIe and Means' concern with the effect of splintered
ownership on managerial incentives was formally developed in
Jensen and Meckling's theory of the firm. s In the Jensen and
Meckling account, management enjoys delegated authority from
shareholders, the firm's principals. However, owing to innate
information problems, shareholders are unable to observe
perfectly the efforts and conduct of their managerial agents, and
rational managers will exploit these monitoring infirmities to
favour their own interests at the expense of shareholders, creating
so-called agency costs. In the Jensen and Meckling model, the
accountability problems are most severe when shareholdings are
widely dispersed. Typically, individual shareholders will refrain
from making investments in managerial monitoring and discipline
because the gains from such investment accrue to all shareholders
(a quasi-public good), but the costs are borne by the activist share-
holders alone.6 To resolve this problem, collective action is
required, whereby all shareholders contribute to monitoring and
disciplinary activities in proportion to their shareholdings.
However, here the shareholder activist confronts innate coordi-
nation problems. In the absence of coercion, shareholders will
rationally decline to invest, preferring instead to free ride on the
efforts of others. Of course, if this is rational for one, it is rational
for all, meaning that effective shareholder activism never gets off
the ground.
The result of attenuated shareholder control is clear: managers
will be able to favour their own personal desires even though
doing so conflicts with shareholder interests in maximizing the
economic value of the firm. These costs, which are reflected in a
reduced share price, come in three principal forms. First,
managers may shirk, i.e., refrain from expending their maximum
effort on behalf of the firm's shareholders. For instance, managers
may not spend the time and effort necessary to identify and select
5 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, "Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and
Ownership" (1976),3J. Fin. Econ. 305.
6 Unless the shareholder owns a block of shares that is large enough to allow the realization
of benefits that exceed investment costs, such unilateral investment will not occur. For a
model in which the conditions for unilateral activism hold, see Bernard Black, "Share-
holder passivity reexamined" (1990),89 Michigan L. Rev. 520.
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those products yielding the greatest net present value for the firm.
The managerial propensity to shirk reflects the fact that the
marginal value of leisure to the manager exceeds the compensated
value oftheir marginal product to the firm's shareholders. Second,
because managers have high levels of non-diversified human
capital investment in the firm, they will systematically adopt
projects which reduce the riskiness of the firm's cash flow, even if
they yield net present values that are lower than alternative
projects with higher levels of firm specific risk that diversified
shareholders would prefer them to select. 7 Third, through its utili-
zation of the corporate machinery, management can divert
corporate assets or income to itself at shareholders' expense. This
can occur in a number of different ways. The most obvious, if not
prosaic, is to funnel corporate resources into personal perquisites,
such as lavish offices, club memberships, or executive jets. Take,
for example, the RJR Nabisco Airforce, comprised of 10 executive
jets and 31 pilots, under the former command of CEO Ross
Johnson. Similarly, diversion can be achieved through bloated
compensation arrangements that bear no relation whatsoever to
the value of senior management's performance. Or, diversion can
take the form of unbargained for self-dealing transactions, in
which the manager transacts with the corporation on non-market
terms.
In the Jensen and Meckling model, the antidote for managerial
accountability problems is straight forward - increased
managerial ownership. By increasing the level of financial
investment in the firm, managerial agency costs are internalized.
In other words, some proportion of the costs of managerial oppor-
tunism are reflected back onto managers as shareholders, and this
cost increases directly with the level of equity ownership. The
7 These concerns are evaluated by investigating the pricing of risky debt and ownership
concentration. When managerial ownership is low, increases in ownership lead to
increases in the incentives to increase shareholder wealth at the expense of bondholder
wealth. This is observed through a positive association between managerial ownership
and bond return premia. As the ownership increases, managers become more risk averse
and their incentives become closely aligned to those of the bondholders. There is an
observed non-positive relation between ownership and bond return premia over this
range. Evidence on the impact of ownership concentration on risk aversion behaviour of
management is also observed in the relationship of ownership concentration and debt
ratios. Since bankruptcy is costly and the risk is difficult to diversify, managers with highly
concentrated holdings will reduce this risk through the debt-equity choice. See E.
Bagnani, N. Milanos, A. Saunders, and N. Travlos, "Managers, Owners, and the Pricing
of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis" (1994), 31 Journal of Finance 453.
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result is that as share ownership increases, managers will think
twice before passing up a valuable investment opportunity or
diverting corporate wealth from shareholders to themselves.
Under this model, the value of a company's shares should be
expected to increase monotonically with increased managerial
equity investment reflecting a closer alignment of shareholder and
managerial interests. This implies that closely held public
companies that are managed by controlling shareholders should
be worth more than their widely held counterparts.
Nevertheless, the Jensen and Meckling model fails to account
for the full range of effects unleashed by heightened managerial
ownership. Unless a manager owns 100% of the outstanding
equity of a company, he or she will still operate under an incentive
to favour his or her own interests at the expense of shareholders. It
is true that as the level of managerial ownership increases, the net
gains from opportunistic behaviour decrease; nonetheless these
gains will persist. The question is whether the gains from oppor-
tunistic behaviour exceed the costs of such behaviour as measured
by the foregone proportional benefits obtained as a shareholder
and the expected costs of getting caught and disciplined. The diffi-
culty is that while the foregone level of shareholder benefits
increases with the manager's equity investment, the expected costs
of the penalty (probability of detection multiplied by the penalty
imposed) decreases with additional investment, making the net
effect of increased managerial ownership somewhat uncertain.
The diminution in expected costs of discipline that track
increased share investment is attributable to two principal factors.
First, as equity control increases, shareholders are better
equipped to have their wishes translated into corporate action
through more effective domination of the board of directors. A
manager with a solid controlling block of voting shares can exert
direct control over the board, a prerogative that may be
unavailable to managers holding only a fractional equity interest.8
8 In this respect, it should be noted that since the costs of expropriatory behaviour are
borne to a larger extent by the controlling shareholder as his or her holding increases, it is
irrational for managers to assemble control blocks in excess of the minimum necessary to
obtain control. The expected impact of entrenchment behaviour should be reflected in the
company's share price. There may be no impact on the market price from holdings greater
than the minimum needed to obtain control; in fact, the greater the holdings the greater is
the cost borne by controlling shareholders and this may somewhat offset, the
entrenchment behaviour. Controlling shareholders may want to have holdings above the
minimum control holdings to provide them with flexibility to finance growth through new
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It could be argued that the difference in the control wielded by
managers over the board of directors differs little between a
widely and closely held company once infirmities in the share-
holder voting process are considered. 9 The argument is that
through their domination of the proxy process, managers in widely
held companies can just as easily secure a board of sympathetic
directors as owner-managers in closely held public companies.
However, while conceding a role for managerial influence in
board appointments in the widely held company, it is important
not to overstate the durability of managerial control over the
corporate board. Support for this proposition is provided by the
wave of board initiated ousters of senior executives of widely held
companies that have occurred over the past several years - ego ,
IBM, General Motors, Manufacturers Life, American Express and
so forth. Thus, while a board in a widely held company can decide
to flex its muscle to discipline corporate management in response
to chronic corporate underperformance, the prospects for such
activism are virtually negligible in the case of a company whose
controlling shareholder is also the manager and has yet to decide
that his or her time is Up.l0
equity issues without being forced to purchase the new equity to maintain their propor-
tionate holdings. They can issue the equity without purchasing new equity as long as they
can maintain control.
9 The claim is that management is able to influence the conduct of the board of directors
through its de facto control of the nomination and agenda setting process. Through
nominations, managers select only those individuals who appear to be predisposed to
management's interests. More importantly, even if not sympathetic to management at the
outset, recognition that the directors serve at management's pleasure is bound to fortify
their sympathies to existing management. Through agenda setting, management is able
steer the board away from decisions that may encroach on their interests. In this manner,
the strength of the board's external scrutiny is impaired. See Victor Brudney, "The
Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?" (1982), 95 Harv L. R. 597;
Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1971).
10 For our discussion the salient question is, what is the marginal value of sizeable
managerial ownership on the demonstrated capacity of the management of widely held
corporations to manipulate the board. We would argue that ownership does not bolster
management's control over nominations or agenda control, but it does undermine the
board's interpretation of its objective function. With shareholders having multiple and
divergent economic interests in the firm, the board's maximand, to maximize the value of
the shareholder's residual claims, becomes clouded. Because managers are owners, the
board becomes more deferential to management's views as to how shareholder wealth
should be enhanced. The common refrain of the outside director in the closely held
company is illustrative of this problem: "It's Joe's company, who am I to second guess his
judgment?" And even if directors are sceptical of management's avowed objectives, they
face the difficult and complex task of forging coherent tradeoffs among competing share-
holder interests.
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A second reason for declining expected discipline costs with
ownership increases relates to the suppression of market mecha-
nisms that operate to mitigate some of the accountability problems
manifest in widely held companies. Perhaps the most important of
these is the threat of managerial displacement through an
unwanted takeover bid - the so-called "market for corporate
control" .11 Depending on the level of opportunistic behaviour and
the costs of engineering a takeover, an acquiror can offer to
purchase at a premium a controlling block of shares, and then
utilize this control to oust existing management. Drawing on the
disciplinary role of the takeover market, Stultz provides a
foundation for a curvilinear relationship of corporate value and
ownership concentration. The premium paid by a hostile bidder
will increase with the fraction of equity owned by the controlling
shareholder but the probability of success of a hostile bid is
negatively related to this ownership proportion. 12 Thus, at low
ownership percentages the bid will likely succeed at a premium
lower than the maximum that would be paid by the bidder. As
ownership increases, the probability of a successful bid decreases,
and to obtain a successful bid at high ownership levels the
premium paid must increase. As the size of the required premium
increases, the willingness of acquirors to bid for control diminishes
correspondingly. Beyond 50%, the probability of a hostile
takeover is zero. Therefore, the value of the firm increases at low
ownership levels, but then falls as ownership increases, reflecting
the lower probability that a hostile bid will be successful at high
ownership levels. At 50%, firm value reaches its minimum.
Although Stultz's conclusion that the value of the firm is
minimized at 50% ownership is overstated, he is undoubtedly
correct in demonstrating the general linkage between firm value
and control market discipline. 13
11 The term was coined by Henry Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control" (1965), 73J. Pol. Econ. 110.
12 R. Stultz, "Managerial Control of Voting Rights, Financing Policies, and the Market for
Corporate Control" (1988), 20 Journal of Financial Economics 25.
13 The Stultz model is based on the takeover market only. The gains from a takeover and
the maximum premium that can be paid will depend upon the performance of incumbent
management and what the new management can do with the firm. In a number of
instances takeovers or management buyouts do occur when there is highly concentrated
ownership. W. Mikkelson and M. Partch, in "Managers' Voting Rights and Corporate
Control" (1989),24 Journal of Financial Economics 263, observe that completed acquisi-
tions are unrelated to manager's voting rights. However, they find that the higher the
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The managerial accountability problems posed by increased
share ownership are buttressed by the evisceration of other
market instruments. The managerial market, for example, is
unlikely to operate when managers wield sizeable ownership
stakes. This market consists of both external and internal markets.
As alluded to previously, the external market disciplines
managers by tying the value of their human capital in alternative
managerial positions to the firm's current performance. The
internal market operates by encouraging lower level managers to
utilize their firm specific information to monitor the performance
of more senior managers. According to Fama, "lower managers
perceive that they can gain by stepping over shirking or less
competent managers above them". 14 However, neither of these
markets are likely to operate in controlled companies. In the
former case, managers discount the probability that they will ever
face discipline (or "settling up") in the external managerial
market. In the latter case, knowing that their efforts will be for
naught, lower level managers refrain from either monitoring the
performance of senior managers, or whistle blowing when lapses
in managerial effort are detected.
A further complication for the analysis arises when the control
group is dominated by a single person or family. Once individual
or family control is accounted for, the behaviourial analysis
becomes much more complex. If the private benefits from control
are exclusively pecuniary in· character, the difficulty is that the
controlling shareholders are more likely than not to be high
income earners who will be less concerned with wealth losses
resulting from corporate inefficiency than will less affluent
investors because of the diminishing marginal utility of money. 15
management's holdings, the less likely there will be an offer or the acquisition of a block
of shares. They also note that the higher the voting control, the more likely that a
takeover offer will lead to a change in control. They also observe that the higher the
management share of the equity, the more likely the firm will engage in a going private
transaction at a premium to the prevailing market price. P. Halpern, R. Kieschnick and
W. Rotenberg in "The Influence of Insiders on LBO Premiums" (1994), Working Paper,
University of Toronto, find that the probability of a firm engaging in a levered going
private transaction compared to either remaining a public firm or being taken over is
positively related to insider ownership. They also observe that the premium in a going
private transaction depends on the interaction of the ownership level and the degree of
prior performance of the managers.
14 Eugene Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980),88 J. Pol. Econ.
288.
15 The theory is that high income earners will value marginal increments of money less than
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While these income effects may make controlling shareholders/
managers less inclined to engage in diversionary behaviour, it also
may make them more inclined to shirk. This is because while
diversion and corporate wealth enhancement are activities that
generate wealth increases for wealthy controlling shareholders, he
or she may rationally refrain from doing either since the expended
effort may outweigh the realized benefits. In these terms, the
effect of income on controlling shareholder behaviour depends on
the relative costs and benefits of engaging in either form of
behaviour, and the relative sensitivity of each to income.
Another difficulty for the analysis involving family or individ-
ually controlled companies is posed by endowment effects. 16
Endowment effects cause individuals to. refrain from selling
certain goods that are in their possession even though the price
offered for the good exceeds their reservation price for buying
them. The effect may be traced to sentimental attachments that
form with respect to a good over time. In the case of control
blocks, the claim is that the existence of endowment effects will
make controlling shareholders more reluctant to part with control,
which, in turn, increases the premium required to effect a transfer.
The existence of endowment effects is more plausible when an
individual or family is the equity-holder rather than a large
corporate bureaucracy.
In conjunction, income and endowment effects suggest that
controlling shareholders dedicated solely to wealth enhancement
may well decide to retain control even though it appears economi-
cally irrational to do so. That a controlling shareholder may decide
to retain control even though the net present value of the
pecuniary benefits is less than the control premium offered
becomes even more likely when non-pecuniary benefits from
control are taken into account. For instance, an aging entre-
preneur may, because of pride or sentimental attachment, retain
managerial control even if she no longer possesses the skills
necessary to lead the company in its current state. I? Alternatively,
low income earners because it can bring them less additional pleasure given the wealth
they have already amassed.
16 For a review of the literature on endowment effects, see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem" (1990),98 Journal of Political Economy 1325. The endowment effect
explains the systematic differences observed between buying and selling prices for
certain goods.
17 That is, the firm grows to a point where the scale of organizational complexity outgrows
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motivated by loyalty or paternal pride, the founder-entrepreneur
may transfer control to a family member who is ill-suited for the
job. In both cases, the utility losses that would accompany a
control transfer are incommensurable with the pecuniary
premium offered, which again results in the controlling share-
holder retaining control even though the wealth losses exceed
offered control premiums.
From this discussion, the effect of ownership on firm value can
be conceived as the product of two competing incentives: conver-
gence (those agency costs reduced by increases in share
ownership) and entrenchment (those agency costs facilitated by
increases in share ownership). Predictably, the value of the firm is
maximized at the point(s) where the marginal cost of
entrenchment is equal to the marginal benefit of convergence.
However, in constructing these values it is important to maintain
sensitivity to income and endowment effects, as well as to the
possible divergences between wealth and utility.
2. Assessing the Effects of Concentrated Ownership on Firm
Performance
(a) Stud ies Based on Tobi n'5 Q
Given the complexities inherent in framing strong a priori
predictions of how the different incentives effects will interact in
the context of specific firms, corporate finance scholars have
turned to empirical techniques to attempt to identify any
systematic relationship between share ownership and firm value.
A number of empirical studies investigating the influence of
the entrepreneur's decision-making capabilities. The theme that management of mature
companies requires different skills than those possessed by the entrepreneur is discussed
in Robert Buchele, Business Policy in Growing Firms (San Francisco, Chandler
Publishing Co., 1967), Donald K. Clifford and R.E. Cavenaugh, The Winning
Performance (New York, Bantam Books, 1985); Peter Drucker, Innovation and
Entrepreneurship (New York, Harper and Row, 1985) at p. 201. For a contrary view, see
Gary E. Willard, David A. Krueger, and Henry R. Feeser, "In Order to Grow, Must the
Founder Go: A Comparison of Performance Between Founder and Non-Founder
Managed High Growth Manufacturing Firms" (1992), 7 Journal of Business Venturing
181. They find no significant differences between founder-managed and professionally
managed firms in a study of 155 mostly high tech firms taken from Inc. 's 1985, 1986, 1989,
and 1990 lists of 100 fastest growing publicly held firms in the United States. Their study
however, suffers from selection bias since it chooses companies which have succeeded;
clearly this is not a random selection and the results are not generalizable to all entrepre-
neurial situations.
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corporate share ownership on firm value use Tobin's Q (the ratio
of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its physical
assets), which reflects the efficiency with which the firm is
managed, and serves as a proxy for firm value. IS
Morck, Shleiffer, and Vishny relate Q ratios of a sample of 371
firms from the Fortune 500 to a set of control variables including
board ownership, for the year 1980. 19 This sample has, on average,
board ownership of 10.6% with 20% of the sample having
holdings in excess of 20% and only 14 firms with holdings at least
equal to 50%.20 Morck et al observe that Q increases over the
range of equity ownership by the board up to 5%, decreases until
25%, and then increases slightly. This observation is consistent
with convergence of interests being the dominant incentive effect
in the lowest and highest ownership levels but the entrenchment
effect being dominant over the middle category. 21 The researchers
also consider how the presence of the founder (or family) in the
firm affects market value. Morck et al compared the value of Q for
firms incorporated before and after 1950 where the founder or
family member was still active in 1980. Not surprisingly, the value
of founder involvement exerted a negative effect on Q for the pre-
1950 cohort and was positive on the post-1950 cohort. This finding
provides some empirical support for the claim that individual or
family control tends to distort executive succession decisions from
those informed by pure efficiency considerations.
Replications of the Morck et al methodology to other samples
and time periods generate conflicting results. 22 As an example,
18 This ratio should reflect the underlying characteristics of the firm on its value. It is high
when the firm has valuable intangible assets such as growth opportunities, monopoly
power, or effective managers who can generate rents for the firm. A value of unity
suggests that the firm is just earning a normal rate of return on its investments.
19 R. Morck, A. Shleiffer, and R. Vishny, "Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis" (1988), 20 Journal of Financial Economics 293.
20 While reflecting characteristics of firms from the Fortune 500 and companies listed on the
NYSE, which imposes minimum liquidity constraints in order to be listed, this sample is
unlikely to reflect ownership characteristics of a broader based set of equity securities.
21 Nevertheless, Morck, et ai, supra, footnote 19, caution that the turning points they
identified are sample specific and other samples and time periods may provide different
results.
22 For instance, H. Chen, J. Hexter and M. Hu use the Fortune 500 firms as well and look at
three sample periods, 1976, 1980, and 1984 ("Management Ownership and Corporate
Value" (1993), Managerial and Decision Economics 335). They observe that Q increases
with ownership in the range of 0 to 5-7%, falls with ownership levels to 10-12%, and then
continues to fall in 1976 but rises slightly in both 1980 and 1984. These results in the two
later time periods are consistent with Morck et aI's observations and the result in the first
period is consistent with continued entrenchment.
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Denis and Denis investigate firm performance for a sample of
companies with managerial share ownership of at least 50% and a
control sample for which managerial ownership levels are less than
20%.23 The authors observe that there is no difference in financial
performance between the firms with concentrated equity holdings
and the control group of firms and conclude that firms choose
efficient organizational structures. Similarly, Holderness and
Sheehan considered large block holdings in which one individual
or entity, usually another firm or trust, owns between 50% and
95% of the equity.24 They compared the Q ratios for majority
owned companies and for a matched control sample of companies
with diffuse equity holdings, and found no significant differences
in Q between the concentrated and diffuse holdings, although the
mean and median values of Q were lower for the former.
However, when they decompose the sample into individual versus
corporate majority owners, an interesting result emerges: whereas
the corporate majority owned sub-sample displays no significant
difference in Q from the control group, the individual majority
owned group has an average Q that is less than the value for the
J. McConnell and H. Servaes also relate Q to control and ownership variables for the
years 1976 and 1986 ("Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value"
(1990),26 Journal of Financial Economics 595). The samples were large, 1173 and 1093
firms, respectively, with the companies listed on either the NYSE and AMEX. McConnell
and Servaes find a non-linear relationship between Q and ownership, increasing at first
and then falling; the turning point was at 49% inside ownership for 1976 and 37.6% for
1986. These results suggest that at higher ownership levels, entrenchment is an important
problem. The differences between this study and Morek et aI's and Chen et aI's may be
due to the use of a sample including companies on the NYSE and the AMEX and not
restricting the sample to the Fortune 500 companies. The McConnell and Servaes sample
will include a larger number of small companies which may be more likely to have
concentrated holdings.
Finally, B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach also observe a non-linear relationship between
Q and CEO stock ownership. They observe that above ownership levels of 20%, Q falls
with increases in ownership but the relationship below 20% demonstrate both agency
costs and alignment of interests depending on the ownership range ("The Effects of
Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" (Winter 1991)
Financial Management 101).
23 D. Denis and D. Denis, "Majority Owner Managers and Organizational Efficiency"
(1994), Journal of Corporate Finance 91. Of approximately 1700 firms on the Value Line
Universe, the authors find only 72 firms for which ownership for the first quarter 1985 is
in excess of 50%. For this sample, 80% of the firms have family involvement or are
managed by the founder of the firm and for these firms 35% have dual class share
structures.
24 C. Holderness and D. Sheehan, "The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held
Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis" (1988),20 Journal of Financial Economics 317.
The sample firms were found on the NYSE and AMEX.
HeinOnline -- 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 24 1996
24 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 26
control sample although the difference lacked statistical signifi-
cance. This result is consistent with individual concentrated
holdings resulting in entrenchment and non-value maximizing
decisions by managers. Holderness and Sheehan also investigated
the sale of control blocks. They observe that when a majority
block is sold, the abnormal stock price returns25 are significantly
different from zero when based on the identity of the seller but not
on the identity of the buyer. For individual and corporate sellers of
majority blocks, there is an abnormal return of 14.2% versus
5.1%, respectively, for the announcement day period and 23.8%
versus 6.7% for a longer period surrounding the announcement
day. This result provides support for the claim that the
entrenchment effects respecting close ownership are most acute
when the equity holder is an individual rather than a corporation,
and means that utility maximization is less than perfectly related to
wealth maximization.
(b) Event Studies Based on Abnormal Share Price Movements
Another way to gauge the impact of control of equity on firm
value is to investigate the impact of unexpected changes in control
(such as when a major blockholder dies) on share prices. Since
such events give rise to an expectation that the control block will
be transferred to another group, it offers an ingenious way to
measure the blockholder's effect on firm value. If, for example,
the blockholder's interests are aligned with those of shareholders,
and their compensation generates no rents either for them or the
shareholders, unexpected death should have no impact
whatsoever on share prices. Indeed, if the managers are very
efficient, and it is costly to replace them with individuals of equal
ability, the company's share price should fall. Alternatively, if the
managers were not efficient and replacement will not be difficult,
or if they were entrenched and apparently not subject to the
normal control of the labour market or the market for corporate
control, the share price should increase.
Johnson et at have investigated the impact of unexpected deaths
of senior executives on the share price of their companies. 26 For
25 Abnormal stock price return is the difference between the actual rate of return on the
stock less the expected rate of return on the security over the same period. The expected
rate of return is based on the normal relationship of the firm's rate ofreturn to the return
on a market index.
26 B. R. Johnson, N. Nagarjan, and H. Newman, "An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction
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the overall sample, they observe that the abnormal return over the
announcement period was slightly positive but not statistically
significant. However, for the 15 cases involving the firm's founder,
the abnormal return over the announcement period was 3.50%
and statistically significant. For the non-founder group of 32 cases
in which the death was not preceded by a brief illness, the share
price fall by 1.16%, which was statistically significant. For the
third group of cases in which there was a brief illness before death
(6 cases), positive but insignificant abnormal returns of .94% were
found. Thus, their study supports the conclusion that founders do
behave in a non-wealth maximizing manner.27
A recent study by Slovin and Sushka focused on the relationship
of the size of the control position of CEOS and founders who died
suddenly and the share price reaction. 28 Slovin and Sushka
concluded that the impact on the share price of the death of an
inside blockholder relates to the individual's ownership in the
equity and not the employment status or whether or not the
individual is a founder. For the overall sample, they found a 3.01
percent positive abnormal return on the announcement date, a
result consistent with entrenchment. They observed that for the
lowest level of ownership, between 5 and 10 percent, there was a
to Sudden Executive Deaths" (1985), Journal of Accounting and Economics 151. The
primary reason for their study was to investigate the functioning of the labour market for
managers. Their sample included 53 instances of unexpected deaths over the period 1971
to 1982; the companies were listed on the NYSE or AMEX. The senior executives were
either chairs of the board of directors, chief executive officers, or individuals with both
responsibilities. On average, the senior executives controlled 9.5 percent of the shares
and in approximately 27 percent of the cases executives controlled in excess of 5 percent
of the shares. In the sample, 28 percent of the cases involved founders who had above
average holdings of shares (the correlation of founder status and share ownership was
+ .65).
27 Ibid. This conclusion is reinforced in a cross sectional analysis of the announcement
period cumulative abnormal return on firm/senior executive specific characteristics. The
cumulative abnormal return was significant and positive when the senior executive was a
founder.
28 M. Slovin and M. Sushka, "Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and
Firm Value: Evidence for the Death of Inside Blockholders" (1993), 30 Journal of
Finance 1293. Their sample period covers 1973 to 1989 and includes instances where
individuals have greater than 5% shareholdings; the shares are traded either on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ. This results in a sample with more concentrated holdings than found
in Johnson; for example, the percentage of shares owned by the CEO or founder averages
approximately 25% whereas for Johnson, the value is 9.5%. Whether the individual was
a CEO, founder, or both appears to have no impact on the percentage holding. In all cases
the mean values were below the median suggesting a skewed distribution of percentage
holdings.
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negative and insignificant excess return; the excess return was
positive and significant for all other categories, although the
impact starts to fall for ownership levels above 30 percent.
Slovin and Sushka also investigated the impact of CEO and
founder status. The average impact for both a CEO death and
non-CEO death were significant and positive, although their values
were not statistically different. Similarly, for the founder/non-
founder dichotomy, the abnormal return to both categories was
positive and significant, although the average values for the
founder and non-founder groups, respectively, were 4.01 % and
2.12%. This observation suggests that it is ownership of the
individual and not founder status or CEO status that determines the
impact on the share price.29
(c) Cross-Country Studies of Comparative Firm Performance
A final datum on the impact of closely-held ownership struc-
tures on firm performance is furnished by Morek and Stangeland's
innovative study on the comparative performance of 327 public
companies in Canada, stratified by share ownership structure, to
their rival industries in the United States.30 The researchers
gauged the competitiveness of the Canadian firms by examining
three different factors: profitability, sales growth, and job
creation. Their principal findings are consistent with the general
theory developed above: closely held Canadian firms are likely to
be younger and smaller than widely held firms, demonstrating
lower profitability, but higher sales and job growth than their U.S.
rival industries. While low profits and high growth are typical for
29 Ibid. Slovin and Sushka test this directly through a cross-section regression of the excess
return on individual specific data. They find that when insider block ownership is intro-
duced in a quadratic form it is significant and there is a smaller but positive share price
reaction above ownership levels of 40%. The introduction of founder and CEO status and
age of the individual have no impact. They also look at the CEO impact for a sample of
events in which the CEO had less than 5% holdings and found that the impact was insignif-
icant. A test of the difference in mean abnormal returns for events in which CEOs have
ownership above 5% and those events with ownership below do not provide any signif-
icant differences. However, comparing the abnormal returns for samples of CEOs with
less than 10% to CEOs with greater than 10% shows a significant difference of slightly
greater than 2 percent. These results suggest that individuals with large ownership
interests manage in ways consistent with entrenchment and an unexpected death leads to
expectations of either a takeover or a change in control with improved operating
performance.
30 Randall K. Morek and David A. Stangeland, "Corporate Performance and Large Share-
holders", draft article dated April 8, 1994 (on file with the authors).
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young companies, Morek and Stangeland find that the lagging
profitability of closely held Canadian firms persists even after firm
age and firm size are taken into account. 31
To explore further the impact of different types of closely held
ownership on firm performance, Morek and Stangeland divided
their sample of controlled firms into three different groups:
founder controlled firms, heir-controlled firms, and firms having a
dominant shareholder who is neither the founder nor heir ("non-
family dominant shareholders"). While the profitability of
founder controlled firms was similar to the U.S. industry baseline,
both the heir controlled and non-family dominant firms' perfor-
mance (measured in terms of their median income per dollar of
sales) was lower than their U.S. industry rivals, although the non-
family dominant firms lagged behind U.S. rivals by less than half
as much as the heir controlled firms. 32 On the basis of these data,
the researchers concluded that: "founders concerned about the
future performance of their firms should, upon retiring, see that
control is transferred to non-family dominant shareholders or
small shareholders rather than to family heirs".33
3. Implications of Theory and Data on Optimal Ownership
Structure
From the theoretical analysis we conclude that there are both
convergence and entrenchment effects of inside ownership on the
value of the equity of firms. The former relates to the confluence
of interests between shareholders and management as inside
ownership increases whereas the latter argues that as ownership
increases the incentives for the majority owner to make decisions
that do not maximize wealth of shareholders but instead maximize
the utility of the controlling individual.
The empirical evidence is generally consistent with the
entrenchment story but there remains some uncertainty as to
whether this is due to founders with large equity positions, heirs of
founders, or only the ownership position and not whether the
blockholder is a founder or a CEO. However, the Canadian
evidence appears to give more weight to founder status.
31 Ibid. Interestingly, widely held Canadian firms have performance attributes that are
statistically indistinguishable from those of matching U.S. industries.
32 The researchers also found that non-family closely held firms have higher growth in
margins than heir controlled firms, but lower than founder controlled firms.
33 Morek and Stangeland, supra, footnote 30, at p. 26.
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Given evidence that high share ownership concentration in
public firms, particularly when individual or family ownership is
involved, is correlated with reductions in firm value, the question
is how best to increase firm value through ownership changes. At
the individual level, one possibility is the going private or
management buyout market. Many studies have demonstrated the
success of this organizational form, despite the fact that the share
structure after the transaction still displays concentrated equity
holdings. 34 The benefits alleged for the going private transaction
include improved monitoring by bond holders and other parties to
the transaction and an improved alignment of interests of
managers and other shareholders. 35 An alternative structure
would be to have shares broadly held but in sufficiently large
quantities to give individual investors an incentive to engage in
meaningful monitoring and perhaps even active participation on
the board. The goal is not necessarily to eviscerate insider
ownership but simply to reduce it to a level where there is
enhanced scope for meaningful monitoring and, perhaps disci-
pline, by outside shareholders. Monitoring by blockholders and
institutional investors has been investigated empirically in a
number of contexts, and has generally supported the existence of
shareholder gains from increased institutional ownership.36
III. THE FACTORS MOTIVATING HIGH LEVELS OF SHARE
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION IN CANADA
The demonstrated inability of high levels of managerial share
ownership to ameliorate entirely the accountability concerns
J4 S. Kaplan, "The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value"
(1989), 24 Journal of Financial Economics 217, A. Smith, "Corporate Ownership
Structure and Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts" (1990), 26 Journal of
Financial Economics 143.
35 Many of the going private transactions arise in firms which already have highly concen-
trated holdings and the transaction actually assists the original controlling shareholders
to cash out on their holdings while maintaining high controlling interests in the equity of
the new company see (R. Elitzur, P. Halpern, R. Kischnick, and W. Rotenberg,
"Modelling the Going Private Transaction", University of Toronto, Faculty of
Management Working Paper (1994); S. Kaplan and J. Stein, 'The Evolution of Buyout
Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980's" (1993), 108 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 313. The ability to engage in these transactions requires the functioning of a
debt market which permits the use of high levels of leverage and custom designed
repayment conditions.
36 See Bernard Black, "The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence" (1992),39 UCLA Law Rev. 895.
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raised by the delegation of authority from shareholders to
managers, makes the dominance of the highly concentrated public
company in Canada somewhat perplexing. If high levels of share
ownership do not maximize the value of the firm in certain circum-
stances - particularly in those cases where high ownership stakes
reside with aging founders or their chosen heirs - we would
expect to observe less durability in the concentrated ownership
structure of public Canadian corporations than is in fact the case.
Stated differently, if ownership matters, is there a reason to be any
less concerned about the dominance of closely held public corpo-
rations in Canada than are American commentators about the
dominance of the widely held public corporation in the United
States? In both cases, it is arguable that the dominant (and fairly
durable) form of corporate ownership may not maximize firm
value. If so, it is important to identify the factors which have
impeded efficient adaptation.
In this part of the article, we explore this issue further by
addressing the factors fuelling the dominance of the closely held
public corporation in Canada. Specifically, we consider both
market and political factors that affect corporate ownership
structure. While we find that a number of factors could have
contributed to the survival of the closely held public corporation in
Canada, only a few factors are plausible. However, to form robust
conclusions, further research in this area is required.
1. Concentration as a Function of High Levels of Firm
Volatility and Small Firm Size
Demsetz and Lehn have argued that share ownership concen-
tration levels are directly related to the volatility of a firm's cash
flows and inversely related to the aggregate size of the firmY The
former relationship holds because volatility in firm performance
confounds the ability of external market constraints (ie., the
managerial or takeover markets) to discern and to discipline poor
managerial performance. When cash flows are volatile, external
monitors are unable to determine whether a reduction in firm
performance is the result of factors within or outside of manage-
ment's control. Inside monitoring by concentrated investors atten-
37 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences" (1985),931. P. E. 1155.
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uates these problems because large owners can elect directors to
the board, which permits access both to real-time information
respecting managerial performance and to levers of discipline over
management. The relationship between firm size and concen-
tration holds because as the value-maximizing size of the firm
increases, the cost of acquiring a control block will also rise, which
will deter control accumulation.
In the Canadian setting, the factors posited by Demsetz and
Lehn may explain higher rates of corporate share ownership
concentration. It could be argued that the resource based
character of the Canadian economy creates higher levels of
earnings volatility for Canadian firms than for firms whose activ-
ities are not subject to vicissitudes of resource pricing. Never-
theless, the link between a resource based economy, earnings
volatility, and increased efficacy of share ownership as a control
mechanism is not self-evident. Even if the resource based
character of the Canadian economy makes the earnings of
Canadian firms more volatile than their American counterparts,
this fact does not by itself make heightened share ownership a
more attractive managerial control mechanism than other
available market instruments. So long as markets are capable of
identifying firms subject to the same or similar market fluctua-
tions, these outside market mechanisms should be able to control
managerial misbehaviour. Indeed, to the extent that the resource
based character of the Canadian economy has been associated
with low levels of value added, this feature can be taken to
increase managerial market accountability (with resource costs
accounting for higher proportions of a firm's final product,
evidence of managerial ineptitude should be more readily
transparent).38
The association between the size of firms and ownership
concentration may, however, be a more robust explanation for
high levels of share ownership in Canada. The argument here is
that the Canadian economy industrialized much later than the
United States and, as a consequence, Canadian firms have not yet
grown to a size where pressures for increased capitalization have
caused firms to sell off equity stakes to new owners. 39 Although
38 From 1990 to 1993 there was an increase in the number of widely held companies on the
TSE 300 Index. By far the largest increase came from the Oil and Gas sector where both
the number of companies represented in the Index and the proportion of widely held
companies in the sector increased. Unless there was a reduction in uncertainty in this
industry, this observation is not consistent with the Demsetz and Lehn position.
39 Morek and Stangeland, supra, footnote 30. Support for their thesis is furnished by a
HeinOnline -- 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 31 1996
1995-96] Corporate Governance in Transition 31
capitalization pressures may cause firms to sell off equity interests,
the pace of ownership deconcentration in Canada is striking. For
example, looking at the market capitalization of firms listed on the
TSE 300 we observe for the period 1980 to 1990, the annual growth
rate in the quoted market value of the TSE 300 firms increased by
.8%. Over the same period, the number of widely held firms on
the TSE 300 decreased from 92 in 1980 to 67 in 1985 to 60 in 1990.
Over this period, real GDP increased at a rate of 3.5 percent per
annum.40 Thus, concentration appears to have increased while the
market value of the companies on the index rose very little.
However, the TSE 300 capitalization values are biased documents
since they measure the float value of the companies. The float
value excludes major blocks held by individuals or institutions.
Thus, even if the market value of the companies was actually
increasing, with an increase in concentration, the quoted market
value that is observed can increase at a slower pace. This time
period was one in which there was a growth in the use of dual class
shares which would have the result of reducing the float weight
market value of the companies on the TSE 300. Also, the growth in
GDP over this period suggests that the TSE float weight market
values were not a good indication of growth in firm size.41
Over the period 1990 to 1994, the float weight market value of
companies on the TSE 300 grew in real terms by 12.7 percent per
annum. For this period, there is information on the market value
of the TSE 300 companies based on total shares outstanding, not
just float weight. For this measure, the real growth per annum was
less, at 7 percent. This is consistent with a reduction in concen-
tration of firms on the TSE 300 and this is observed in the increase
matched sample of similar sized firms in Canada and the United States, which found that
large Canadian firms were not more closely held than American firms of similar size in
the same industries.
40 We defined widely held as the holding by an individual or group of less than orequal to 15
percent of the outstanding equity. As noted in a subsequent section, some of the
observed increases in the number of widely held companies may not reflect a true change
in control of companies since the change in status from a closely to a widely held company
may reflect the sale by a company of a small (IS to 20 percent) portfolio interest in the
previously defined closely held company. See footnote 105, infra.
4\ The TSE 300 Index started in 1977. Prior to this period there was an industrial index in
which the number of firms in the index changed from year to year. In 1965 there were 87
companies in this index of which 64 were widely held. By 1975 there were lSI companies
in the index and 74 were widely held. Unfortunately with the changing number of firms in
the index, the market capitalization figures are not very useful. All data is obtained from
various issues of the Toronto Stock Exchange Review.
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in the number of widely held firms to 125. Surprisingly, this
reduction in concentration occurred in a period of recession and
retrenchment where companies were evaluating their operating
strategies and restructuring their operations. The real growth rate
in GDP over the period 1990 to 1994 was 1.3 percent which is much
less than the growth rate for the period 1980 to 1990. This is not
the scenario envisaged by Demsetz and Lehn in which the
increasing size of firms will lead to decreased concentration.
This evidence suggests that ownership concentration increased
over a period in which there was sustained economic growth and
decreased when growth was reduced. Thus the pressures for
increased capitalization that precede firm growth have been met in
Canada but without any appreciable unbundling of voting
interests.42 Thus, the correlation between firm size and ownership
concentration attracts some surface plausibility. However, the fact
that public Canadian corporations have been able to achieve high
levels of market capitalization without significant deconcentration
and the fact that any deconcentration occurred in periods of low
economic growth suggests that other factors are implicated in
explaining the persistence of concentrated firms.
2. Rules Governing Downstream Investment Activities of
Canadian Financial Intermediaries
A second plausible explanation for the existence and durability
of the high levels of share ownership concentration is based on
Roe's political theory of the modern American corporation.43 As
discussed above, the theory posits that the emergence of the Berle
and Means' corporation was not the product of innate evolu-
tionary forces, but rather the direct result of a series of deliberate
legislative choices that sterilized the capacity of pools of American
financial capital to invest in or to vote the equities of American
corporations. The concern, according to Roe, was that Wall Street
would own Main Street, creating a level of concentrated economic
and political power that was incompatible with American
populism. But in Canada the concern over concentrated economic
power was never as acute as in the United States. The imperatives
of creating an integrated national economy in a country having
42 Infra, footnote 103.
43 Roe, supra, footnote 2.
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vast geographical space and only limited population accounted for
a more permissive attitude toward concentration. Undoubtedly,
Tory political traditions buttressed this view. 44 In the case of
financial market structure, these imperatives supported the
growth of large financial intermediaries, whose investment activ-
ities were not nearly as constrained as counterparts in the United
States. The salient question is whether Canadian financial
intermediaries exploited this clout by investing directly in the
equities of commercial companies, nurturing the high levels of
ownership concentration found in Canada.
Superficial review of the structure and history of legislation
governing Canadian banks and insurance companies reveals that
legislative prohibitions did not restrain investment activities. 45 If
banks and insurance companies wanted to invest in commercial
equities, the legislative framework was not a serious obstacle.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Canadian financial intermediaries
did not exploit their ability to invest in commercial equities,
meaning that the source of concentration must reside elsewhere.
(a) Banks
The first general bank legislation was passed in 1871 in Canada,
and placed no quantity restrictions on the purchase, sale or
holding of shares by banks. The legislation did, however, include a
prohibition on the banks' ability to "either directly or indirectly
. . . engage in any trade whatever .. . except in such trade
generally as pertains to the business of banking", a provision
which has been preserved in each re-enactment of the Bank Act
since 1871.46 Although the prohibition could have been inter-
preted to limit downstream equity investments by Canadian
banks, Canadian courts have consistently interpreted the
restriction narrowly. This conferred broad power on the banks to
44 Gad Horowitz, "Tories, Socialists, and the Demise of Canada", (May-June 1965), 2
Canadian Dimension 12; Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York,
Basic Books, 1963).
45 We focus in this discussion on the value of bank and insurance company investments.
Banks accounted for 72.6%,52.6%,45.9%, and 28.9% of total Canadian intermediated
assets in 1870, 1900, 1930, and 1968, respectively, while life insurance companies
accounted for 2.4%, 13.1 %,26.0%, and 13.6% of total intermediated assets during the
same time periods. In tandem, the assets of banks and life insurance companies were the
most significant of any private intermediaries during these periods. E.P. Neufeld, The
Financial System ofCanada (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1972), p. 52.
46 S.C., 1871, c. 5, s. 40.
2-25 c.n.u.
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invest in commercial companies and to intervene in the business
and affairs of the investee company in the event that such inter-
vention was necessary to protect the value of the bank's
investment.47
Nevertheless, the level of investments by Canadian banks in
corporate securities was never large, and, as a consequence, they
were never able to assert their voice in corporate affairs in the way
that banks in other jurisdictions did. 48 The level of securities held
by Canadian banks as a percentage of total Canadian assets was
6.6% in 1926; 6.8% in 1935; 4.7% in 1955; 5.0% in 1965; and 6.0%
in 1980.49 Neufeld attributes the lack of interest in equity securities
47 See, for instance, Northern Crown Bank v. Great West Lumber (1914),17 D.L.R. 593,6
W.W.R. 528 (Alta. c.A.); White v. Bank of Toronto, [1953J 3 D.L.R. 118, [1953J O.R.
479 (Ont. C.A.). To fall outside of the prohibition, a bank needed to demonstrate a
proper motive, ie., that the bank's activities were not concerned with earning profits
from trading, but with the safeguard of its security. However, this requirement did not
appear to be onerous. So long as the company in which the bank had invested had some
outstanding indebtedness to the bank, the restriction could be avoided. See discussion in
1. Baxter, The Law of Banking and the Canadian Bank Act, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Carswell
Co., 1968), p. 198. Indeed, in Whiteetal. v. BankofTorontoetal., [1953J 3 D.L.R. 118
(Ont. c.A.), the court held, at p. 125, that it could find nothing in the provisions of the
Bank Act
... to suggest that a bank may not "deal in" the stock of its corporate debtor just as
freely as it might deal in the stock of a corporation not its debtor or, for the matter in
bonds of the Dominion of Canada ... The conduct of modern business inevitably
leads to an infinite variety ofsituations not the least complicated of which may occur
in the carrying on in this country "of such business generally as appertains to the
business of banking" and it seems to me that this has been recognized throughout
the numerous decennial revisions of the Bank Act by the use of broad and general
terms in prescribing what a bank may do.
It was not until the re-enactment ofthe Bank Act in 1967 that quantitative restrictions on
the equity participation of banks were introduced in the statute, a change which followed
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance of 1964 (the
Porter Report). The ostensible concern for the prohibition was to "avoid concentration
of power and to present the banks from engaging indirectly in trade or business". See
Minister of Finance, "Canadian Banking Legislation (White Paper)", August 1976, p.
37.
48 For a contrary and unsubstantiated view, see Frank and Libbie Park, The Anatomy of
Big Business (Toronto, J. Lewis & Co., 1973),atp. 71:
It is through the control of financial institutions that the financial groups maintain
their control of the wealth producing companies... At the centre of this financial
and industrial corporate structure lie the chartered banks ... Linked to the banks
are trust companies, the life insurance companies, the ioan and mortgage
companies, the investments trusts, all in control of vast assets and contributing to
the ability of the financial oligarchy to control the economy of the country.
The Park's concept of control appears to be wider than the ability to control through
equity ownership. The Banks and other financial institutions have a significant impact on
firms through their substantial debt holdings. This can be crucial if companies, in earlier
periods, relied more heavily on financial institutions to finance growth since equity
markets were not well developed.
49 Data came from Bank of Canada Statistical Summary (selected years). The percentages
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to the growing need for large scale government financing during
the wars and the depression and the "banks' sad (almost fatal in
one case) experience with railway financing". 50 An alternative
explanation is offered by Jamieson; the banks' concern with
liquidity and stability skewed investment in securities to
government backed debt. 51 And finally, Niosi argues that the
banks' disinterest in equity ownership reflected the "formative
and otherwise pervasive influence of the British financial system
on financial practices in Canada", which placed a premium on
traditional debt lending over various forms of equity investment
that would facilitate a more vigorous and direct role for banks in
the development and control of industry.52
(b) Insurance Companies
Although somewhat more complicated, the case of Canadian
insurance companies reveals more lenient statutory investment
rules for Canadian companies in comparison to their American
counterparts, but, as in the case of Canadian banks, a reluctance
of the part of the insurance companies to maximize the scope of
permissible equity investment under these rules. While the initial
scheme of federal insurance legislation, the Dominion Insurance
Act (1868),53 contemplated differential investment powers for
insurance companies depending on their size,54 by 1899, the
are biased upwards because they do not discriminate between corporate and municipal
securities. Nor do the figures take into account different types ofcorporate securities, ie. ,
bonds, debentures, and equities.
50 Supra, footnote 43, at p. 113.
51 See A.B. Jamieson, Chartered Banking in Canada (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1953) pp.
184-87 for a discussion on the investment and securities department activities of
Canadian banks. The argument is that mark to market accounting treatment of equities
reduced the attractiveness of these investments in comparison to other, more fungible
assets. This is because any writedown in the value of these assets would impact on capital
levels, which, in the context of highly leveraged financial institutions, would dictate a
contraction in assets. Further, to the extent that management bonuses are based on the
market value of the portfolio, use of equities would increase the variability of bonuses.
52 Jorge Niosi, The Economy of Canada: A Study of Ownership and Control, 2nd rev. ed.
(Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1982), chapter I.
53 An Act Respecting Insurance Companies, S.c. 1868, c. 48.
54 The 1868 statute remitted to the individual corporate charters of insurance companies the
task of constraining investment activity. However, the two largest insurance companies,
Canada Life and Sun Life, had no restrictions on their power to invest in equities.
(Specifically, the charters provided that "it shall be lawful for the said corporation to
purchase and hold, for the purpose of investing therein the stocks of any of the banks
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statute was amended to permit all life companies to invest in
corporate securities. While most companies were reluctant to
exploit fully the scope for permissible equity investment, there
were notable exceptions. For instance, under the leadership of
T.B. Macaulay, the Sun Life Assurance Company sought to make
equity investments in newly emerging industries, such as
electricity.55 By 1923, the company owned and operated 55 utility
companies through a holding company, Illinois Traction. 56 But, by
the early part of the 20th century, American insurance companies
were coming under increasing criticism from the press for a wide
range of activities, the result of which was the adoption of legis-
lation (the 1906 "Armstrong laws") barring equity ownership by
American insurance companiesY Calls for reform spilled over to
Canada; by 1906, the federal government had appointed the
Royal Commission on Life Insurance to investigate the industry,
which, despite having failed to discern levels of abuse comparable
to the American experience, recommended the adoption of legis-
lative reforms that closely paralleled the American model.58
However, Parliament failed to adopt many of the reforms recom-
mended by the Royal Commission. In the case of equity invest-
ments, the Insurance Act (1910) limited equity investment by
insurance companies to a maximum of 30% of the stock of anyone
corporation, and only then subject to a 7-year dividend test of at
, least 4% .59
By 1927, the provisions contained in the 1910 insurance statute
were relaxed, permitting insurance companies to invest in the
common stock of commercial companies that had did not meet the
or other chartered companies ...") See An Act to incorporate "The Canadian Life
Insurance Company", S.c. 1849, c. 168; and An Act to incorporate "The Sun Insurance
Company of Montreal", S.C. 1865, c. 43. For a further discussion, see I.M. Drummond,
"Canadian Life Insurance Companies and the Capital Market, 1890-1914" (1962), 28
Can. J. Econ. 204 at p. 205.
55 G.H. Harris, The President's Book: The Story of the Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada (Montreal, Southam Press, 1928), p. 184. See also J. Schull, The Century of the
Sun (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1971).
56 Schull, supra, footnote 53, at p. 45. The holding company was sold in 1923 for a
substantial profit.
57 H.R. Grant, Insurance Reform (Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State University Press, 1979); M.
Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard
Oniversity Press, 1963). Specifically, see Law of April 27 , 1906, ch. 326, s.100, 1906 N. Y.
Laws 763, 797.
58 Report ofthe Royal Commission on Life Insurance (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1907).
59 The Insurance Act, 1910, R.S.C. c. 32, s. 59.
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previously stipulated dividend test so long as they had paid out
$500,000 in dividends in a given year. 6U Because of concern over
the deflection of managerial talent and energies from the internal
management of the insurance company to management of
downstream investee companies, some companies placed self-
imposed restrictions on the scope of their investment in
commercial equities.61 Following the market crash of 1929, the
statutory investment restrictions were tightened to limit the
amount of permissible equity investment to 15% of the total
investment portfolio. 62 Yet this constraint was seldom binding;
buffeted by losses sustained during the depression, and fearful of
the regulatory consequences of mark to market accounting
treatment of stocks, insurance companies refrained from making
significant investments in equities during the post-War period. 63
Indeed, even though the 15% limit on equity investment was
raised to 25% in 1965, the change had no appreciable effect on
investment activity by the insurance companies.64
Thus, when one compares the actual level of equity investments
made by major Canadian intermediaries with the level of permis-
sible investments, the growth of the concentrated company in
Canada cannot be explained by the role of large pools of financial
capital. That is, Canadian controlling shareholders were able to
cement their control over commercial companies without having
to enlist equity support from Canadian banks and insurance
companies.65
60 Neufeld, supra, footnote 43, at p. 240.
61 For instance, Sun Life decided to adopt the principle that it would not acquire "more
than 10 per cent of the common stock of anyone company, no matter how strong and
prosperous it might be" Harris, supra, footnote 53, at pp. 195-96.
62 Porter Report, supra, footnote 45, at p. 249.
63 W.M. Hood and O.W. Main, "The Role of the Canadian Life Insurance Companies in
the Post-War Capital Market" (1956), 22 Can. J. Econ. 467 at p. 478.
64 S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 5(5). The legislation enacted a number of other changes designed
to increase the attractiveness of equity investment to insurance companies. Yet,
according to one commentator, the life insurance industry was "scarcely galvanized by
the new rules. Total industry investment in common stocks stood at about 4% of
portfolio between 1961 and 1964 and there was not upward change in 1965, even though
the life firms have been badgered by critics to 'abandon the depression complex' " See B.
Lee, "Insurance, The Magic of Averages", The Globe and Mail, 1966 at p. 52.
65 Other researchers have also concluded that Canadian financial intermediaries played
only a marginal role as equity investors in the development of non-financial companies.
Niosi, for instance, supra, footnote 50, at p. 63, states that: "the traditional picture of
Canadian finance, one of abstention (by Canadian financial intermediaries) from the
founding, reorganization and control of non-financial corporations, has remained
unchanged. "
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3. Low Costs of Borrower Screening and Monitoring
Experienced by Canadian Banks
Another possible reason for the persistence of high levels of
ownership concentration. is the existence of debt monitoring
economies that may have lowered the costs of debt to Canadian
borrowers, enabling controlling shareholders to obtain capital for
industrial expansion through high levels of debt rather than
through sale ofequity. In this vein, Daniels and Triantis argue that
bank debt possesses several important governance characteristics
that contribute to the control of managerial agency problems.66 In
Canada, debt monitoring economies reflected the dominant role
of the major banks in the Canadian financial system, particularly
in contrast to the more fragmented banking system of the United
States. For instance, Shearer et al report that, in 1984, there were
7,457 bank branches in Canada, with the five largest banks having
over 1,000 branches each, whereas in the United States there were
15,000 separate banks having 39,000 branches, or no more than
2.6 brancheseach. 67 Whereas the growth and consolidation of unit
banks in the United States was hobbled by a range of legislative
restrictions (most importantly, restrictions on inter-state
banking), the expansion of Canadian banks was facilitated by a
permissive regulatory environment that, among other things, did
not limit inter-provincial branching.68 Not only did inter-state
branching restrictions inhibit American banks' ability to realize
monitoring economies, but it also made them less stable than their
Canadian counterparts because of limits on the geographic diver-
sification of their asset base.
The monitoring economies realized by the major Canadian
banks were manifest in two principal ways. First, the large
absolute size of the Canadian banks facilitated the realization of
operational scale economies that permitted the fixed cost of
investment in monitoring mechanisms to be spread over more
transactions, resulting in lower costs per transaction. Second,
buttressing this effect, the large relative role of the Canadian banks
66 R. Daniels and G. Triantis, "The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance"
(1995),83 University of California Law Rev. 5.
67 R. Shearer, J. Chant and D. Bond, The Economics ofthe Canadian Financial System, 2d
ed. (Scarborouglr, Ontario, Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1984), p. 225.
68 For a discussion of the legislative history of the McFadden Act (The National Bank Act,
44 Stat. 1228, 12 U.S.c. ss. 36 (c)(I) and (2), see First National Bank of Logan v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966)).
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in the economy lowered ex ante screening and ex post monitoring
costs for lenders. Screening costs were reduced by the more
efficient reputational markets for borrowers that operated in
Canada. With control over lending concentrated in a handful of
lenders, the opportunities for banks to exchange information
regarding borrower misbehaviour were heightened in relation to
the opportunities enjoyed by banks in the United States. The
existence of these informal communication networks made the
sting of reputational sanctions faced by opportunistic borrowers
more severe in Canada than the United States. For example, with
these informal communication networks in place, opportunistic
borrowers whose credit lines had been cut off by one Canadian
bank would find it extremely difficult to obtain alternative
financing by simply "crossing the street" to another bank.
Monitoring costs were lowered by the higher levels of trust that
Canadian banks placed in the integrity of each other's monitoring
effort, enabling lenders to rationalize monitoring effort for
borrowers. 69
Building on the Canadian banks' superior monitoring capabil-
ities was the absence of any disabling constraint on the exercise of
bank voice when dealing with financially distressed borrowers. In
the United States, the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordi-
nation limits the degree of control that a lender can exercise over
the business and affairs of a failing borrower, which undermines
the degree of effective discipline that can be imposed on
borrowers. 7o Under the doctrine, the court is authorized to subor-
dinate a lender's claim if the lender obtains an advantage at the
69 In cases where multiple banks have lent funds to a single debtor, only one bank should be
responsible for the monitoring effort. Otherwise, banks will be making duplicative
investments in the same monitoring activity. But the difficulty is that in the absence of
trust, banks having delegated their monitoring responsibility to a lead bank will fear that
the bank will utilize its access to information to obtain an advantage (such as a priority)
should the lender encounter financial difficulty. While there are a range of contractual
solutions to this problem, the ability to rely on fair treatment by the lead lender is
perhaps the most attractive solution. See the discussion in Daniels and Triantis, supra,
footnote 64.
70 Bankruptcy Code, §510(c). Most courts have required that the lender in control (an
insider) engaged in ineqUitable conduct that resulted in injury to other creditors or
conferred an unfair advantage to the lender. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel
Co.), 563 F. 2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). If the lender does not have sufficient control to be
viewed as an insider, the courts have imposed a stricter requirement of egregious conduct
such as fraud or misrepresentation. See In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988, 997 (W.O. Wis.
1984).
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expense of other creditors as a result of its control over the
borrower's management. The clearest case of control is a lender
who holds a majority block of voting shares of its borrower, either
directly or through a pledge of the shares. 71 However, the
equitable subordination doctrine recognizes also the leverage that
stems from instruments other than equity voting rights. Hence,
bankruptcy courts also scrutinize the behaviour of a lender who
controls its borrower's cash flow: for instance, by holding an
assignment of accounts receivable or signing authority on the
debtor's current account. 72 A lender with the requisite degree of
control may be held accountable for its actions under a fiduciary
standard. 73 Therefore, if the lender uses its control over the
borrower to obtain an advantage at the expense of other creditors,
its claim may be subordinated to unsecured claims. 74 In contrast,
Canadian courts have refrained from adopting the equitable
subordination doctrine, allowing Canadian banks to utilize real-
time firm specific information gleaned from their monitoring
activities to support a more vigorous role in the business and
affairs of a borrower experiencing financial distress. 75
The significance of these bonding and monitoring economies,
71 Process-Manz Press Inc. (Re), 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill., 1964) (lender held voting
rights in 90% of borrower's common stock); American Lumber (Re) , 5 Bankr. 470, 478
(D. Minn. 1980) (lender had right to vote pledged shares in the borrower).
72 Along with voting control, control over cash flows appears to be the most prominent
indicia of control. See Process-Manz Press, Inc. (Re) , 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill., 1964)
(lender held assignment of receivables, collected the proceeds and supplied the funds for
payroll and other expenses); American Lumber (Re) , 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980)
(lender foreclosed on its security interest in the debtor's receivables and contract rights,
and refused to honour the debtor's payroll checks).
73 See, e.g., Teltronics Services (Re) , 29 Bankr. 139,170-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 1983).
74 So, for instance, if a controlling lender receives a new security interest (American
Lumber (Re), 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (D. Minn., 1980) (controlling lender received new
security interests in inventory and equipment from its distressed borrower); Beverages
International Ltd. (Re), 50 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Mass., 1985) (creditor delayed in
obtaining and recording a blanket security interest to encourage third parties to extend
credit to the debtor or benefits from an increase in the value of an existing security
interest at the expense of unsecured creditors, (for example, through its control over the
disbursements of the debtor, a lender allowed only those payments that were likely to
enhance or preserve the value of its collateral: American Lumber) it may have its claim
subordinated in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
75 In Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (1992), 97 D.L.R.
(4th) 385, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 558, Justice Iacobucci, in dicta, refused to consider whether
the equitable subordination doctrine should exist in Canada, at p. 609 S.c. R.: "As I see
the matter, however, it is not necessary in the circumstances of this case to answer the
question of whether a comparable equitable doctrine should exist in Canadian law and I
expressly refrain from so doing".
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coupled with greater latitude for the exercise of voice, may be
more difficult to sustain as financial markets in Canada become
more susceptible to entry by domestic and foreign financial and
market intermediaries. Nevertheless we believe that the banks'
historic dominance in the Canadian economy constitutes a
plausible, partial explanation for high levels of ownership concen-
tration among Canadian commercial companies. Ultimately,
however, to substantiate this proposition, a time series analysis of
the capital structure of Canadian public companies against
matched companies in the United States. Such a study would
confirm whether Canadian closely held companies were more
highly leveraged than their American counterparts, reflecting our
thesis that debt was a less expensive means of raising capital in
Canada than equity.76
4. Regulatory Distortions
A final reason for the persistence of concentrated ownership in
Canada is the existence of sundry regulatory distortions. In some
cases, regulatory distortions provide an explanation for other
phenomena discussed previously in this part of the article. For
instance, it is arguable that the mercantalist industrial policies
pursued by a succession of Canadian governments created a highly
protected product market that allowed Canadian manufacturers
to enjoy high profits with small scale, high cost production facil-
ities that focused on manufacturing a diverse set of products for
local consumption. 77 In the absence of any impetus to sell their
goods and services into more competitive export markets,
manufacturers faced less incentive to raise risk capital (through
equity sales) for the purposes of investment in production
economies.
But regulatory intervention effected concentration levels in
ways other than by distortions in firm growth and performance.
The same mercantalist policies that skewed domestically owned
corporations towards small scale, high cost production also
76 Here, we should note that recent comparative work by Rajan and Zingales of the capital
structure of companies in G-7 countries in the 1980s reveals a surprising level of conver-
gence of leverage ratios. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "What Do We Know
About Capital Structure? Some Evidence From International Data" (1994), Working
Paper No. 4875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Working Paper Series.
77 The literature on this point is reviewed in Richard G. Harris, Trade, Industrial Policy and
Canadian Manufacturing (Toronto, Ontario Economic Council, 1984).
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exerted a similar effect on foreign firms wishing to sell into the
Canadian market. To surmount the high tariff barriers protecting
Canadian industry, foreign firms were forced to enter the
Canadian market through partially owned foreign subsidiaries
whose production was keyed to the demands of the Canadian
market. Because these firms were sheltered from external compe-
tition by the same barriers that protected domestically owned
firms, the incentives for efficient production were similarly
dampened. 78 Complicating matters was the fact that Canadian tax
and foreign investment policy encouraged the sale of minority
equity blocks in these firms to public shareholders, nurturing the
managerial entrenchment problems discussed earlier.79
However, restrictions on the inward flow of goods, services, and
capital were not the only culprits. Canadian governments also
established restrictions on the outward flow of investment which
conferred excessive bargaining power on Canadian issuers in
domestic capital markets. Perhaps the most important restriction
was the foreign property rule which penalized investment
portfolios having in excess of 10% of their value in foreign assets.80
These restrictions enabled domestic issuers to raise equity capital
without having to part with voting control over the corporation's
assets. .
78 This point is persuasively made in H.c. Eastman and S. Stykolt, The Tariff and Compe-
tition in Canada (Toronto, Macmillan, 1967). See also E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of
Canadian Industry, 2nd ed. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. xxii: "It is
fairly convincingly established that the most important ultimate determinants of this
inefficient industrial structure have been Canadian and foreign protection against trade,
a lack of effective competition (partly because of tariffs and a weak anti-combines
policy), and badly devised government industrial policies on research and other
matters" .
79 Several examples can be cited. The tax incentives contained in the 1963 federal budget
which lowered withholding taxes on dividends from 15% to 10% for companies benefi-
cially owned by Canadians to the extent of at least 25% of their voting stock, and also
where the parent company and its associates held no more than 75% of the voting shares
and the stock of the subsidiary was listed on a Canadian exchange; the establishment of
the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1974 and its attention to Canadian share
ownership as one of the criteria necessary for entry into Canada; and the incentives set
out in the Trudeau government's National Energy Program for Canadian ownership.
80 S.c., 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 206. The restriction now stands at 20% following a statutory
amendment made in 1991. See discussion in Daniels and MacIntosh, "Toward a
Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime", supra, footnote 3, and in B. Smith, B.
Amoako-Adu, and J. Schnabel, "Characteristics and Trends of Restricted Shares Listed
on the Toronto Stock Exchange", Working Paper No. NC 89-10, and B. Smith and B.
Amoako-Adu, "Financing Canadian Companies with Restricted Shares" (1991),
MCMRD Monograph Series, University of Western Ontario.
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Suggestive evidence of the bargaining power exerted by
Canadian issuers is furnished by the number of public Canadian
corporations having dual class share structures.8) Under a dual
class share structure, control is held by an individual or related
group through their ownership of the voting (superior voting)
shares which need not be listed for trading on a stock exchange.82
This control block, however, represents a small proportion of the
total equity of the firm. 83 This dual class structure can lead to a
deleterious impact on shareholder wealth since the control group
can entrench itself while owning only a small proportion of the
firm's total equity.84 These structures are most problematic when
they are implemented through midstream amendments to the
firm's capital structure, which many commentators regard as
coercive.85 Nevertheless, to the extent that regulatory distortions
81 Smith, Amoako-Adu, and Schnabel, (ibid.), note that as a proportion of market value of
the TSE 300, dual class shares rose from a low of approximately 3% in 1979 to a high of
15% in 1989. As of JUly of 1993,179 out of some 1,502 issues listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange were restricted voting shares. On the TSE 300,68 companies utilized restricted
voting shares. The TQMV (total quoted market value) of the 68 companies was $45.6
billion, or 14% of the TSE 300's TQMV. Further underscoring the role of restricted shares
is the fact that they comprised $37.4 billion, or 82% of the issuers' TQMV (the data was
furnished by J. Schmid, November 1,1993). Smith and Amoako-Adu also report that the
growth of this share structure was concentrated in the early to mid-1980s. As of 1989,
40% of the listed firms in the transportation, communications and merchandising groups
had dual class share structures. There were 160 firms with dual class shares on the
Toronto Stock Exchange of which 67 had both classes of shares listed on the exchange;
the majority listed only the inferior voting share with the superior voting share being
privately held. For those shares which had both classes listed on the exchange, the single
largest shareholder or group of related shareholders owned approximately 50% on
average of the voting shares.
82 There are a number ofother countries in which dual class shares are found. These include
Israel, Britain and Sweden among others. Dual class shares can have different voting
attributes. For example, they can be either voting/non-voting shares or superior/inferior
voting shares.
83 Total equity is defined as the sum of the voting (superior voting) shares and non-voting
(inferior voting) shares.
84 When the control group owns the same percentage of the voting shares and of the total
equity, non-shareholder maximization behaviour by the management/control block
group is reflected as a cost to management; this will provide some restraint on the non-
shareholder wealth maximizing behaviour of management. However, under dual class
shares, the link between ownership and voting rights is severed, meaning that control
block holders do not bear the full cost of their non-wealth maximizing behaviour. Thus,
the concentrated voting share ownership permits entrenchment behaviour while the
costs of this behaviour are shared among the total share holdings, both voting and non-
voting. In this vein, Richard Ruback has argued that "dual-class plans may be the most
effective universal antitakeover device ever invented" in "Coercive dual-class exchange
offers" (1988),20 Journal of Financial Economics 153.
85 Dual-class share recapitalizations can occur in a number of different ways. The first is via
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have artificially increased the market power of Canadian issuers,
these structures may be problematic even when implemented by
way of initial offering.86 These concerns have been validated by
anempirical analysis of the market price effect to the
announcement of dual class share structures. In a study of 62 dual
class firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, Jog and Riding
found that 67% of the firms in the sample had negative price
effects over the period 1 day prior to and 1 day subsequent to the
announcement of dual class transactions.87
an exchange transaction in which shareholders approve the creation of a new class of
super voting common shares that have dividend payments below the rates of pre-existing
common stock and are subject to various transfer restrictions. Following the creation of
this class of shares, existing common shareholders are then provided with an opportunity
to tender their shares in exchange for the newly created class of shares. Alternatively,
they can retain their existing shares. Typically, only the inside management group will
opt for the newly created shares because of the restrictions on share transfer. The second
technique involves special stock dividends. In this case, the corporation dividends out the
newly created shares to existing common stock holders; however, because the superior
voting rights of the new class of shares are nullified on subsequent transfers, the inside
control group (which does not transfer its shares) ends up bolstering its initial control
position. The third technique is a modification of share voting rights in which superior
voting rights are issued to only those shareholders whose ownership of existing common
shares exceeds some minimum prescribed amount. See discussion in Jeffrey N. Gordon,
"Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice"
(1988), 76 California L.R. 1, at pp. 40-42. After the creation of the dual class share
structure, the consolidation of control is further buttressed by heavy reliance on subor-
dinate voting shares in subsequent transactions (such as stock splits and dividends, acqui-
sitions, convertible bond issues, and public offerings). In Canada, Smith et al., supra,
footnote 78, report that 71.95% of the percentage of total equity created after the
formation of a dual class share structure is in the form of restricted shares and only
26.77% in the form of superior shares. Further consolidation was achieved by conversion
of voting to restricted shares and by corporate stock repurchases. In Canada, the
issuance of dual class share structures by way of midstream amendment is governed by
Ontario Securities Policy 1.3 ("Restricted Shares" (1984), 7 O.S.C.B. 5357) which
provides for, among other things, minority shareholder approval of the creation of a dual
class share structure by a broad array of means.
86 Several American commentators have challenged the claim that there is any salient
distinction between initial and mid-stream introduction of dual class share structures.
See, for instance, Louis Lowenstein, "Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC
Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson" (1990), 31 Corporate Practice Commentator 595 at
p. 597; Joel Seligman, "Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy" (1986),54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687. For a
contrary view, see Ronald Gilson, "Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The
Relevance of Substitutes" (1987),73 Virginia L. R. 807.
87 Vijay M. Jog and Allan L. Riding, "Market Reactions of Return, Risk and Liquidity to
the Creation of Restricted Voting Shares", RCSA/CJAS, March 1989, p. 62. The
researchers also found that the risk (as measured by betas) of restricted voting shares was
approximately twice that of superior voting shares, and that this result was significant at
the 5 % level 40 days after the date of listing. They claim that the increased risk of the
stocks reflected the differential control wielded by superior and restricted voting share-
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Against the shareholder exploitation view of dual class recapi-
talizations, several researchers have argued that these structures
are efficiency enhancing for firms with high growth
opportunities. 88 Specifically, if the value of the firm's potential
projects cannot easily be communicated to or observed by outside
shareholders, managers will be forced to provide additional
investment in the firm and that increases their non-diversifiable
firm specific risks. Dual class capital structures reduce the risk of
displacement in the event that the investment sours, making
management .more amenable to undertaking these investments.
In the United States, there is some evidence that companies
with dual class share structures do, in fact, experience high post-
transaction rates of growth and that this growth is fuelled by
external equity financing. 89 In Canada, the results of the Morck
and Stangeland study offer some weak support for the efficiency
hypothesis; firms with dual class share structures showed faster
sales growth than American rivals, but this growth did not carry
over to job creation.90 However, militating against this claim is the
fact that Canadian dual class firms exhibited profitability signifi-
cantly below their U.S. rival industries and Canadian "one-
vote-per-share" firms.
5. Conclusion
This survey reveals that several different factors may explain the
persistence of high levels of share ownership concentration in
Canada. On balance, we favour a multi-factor explanation that
draws on the delayed effects of industrial development, the distor-
tionary effects of government trade and investment protection
policy, and, to a lesser degree, on the role of the Canadian banks
in efficient debt monitoring. We do, however, discount the impact
that liberalized investment rules governing bank and insurance
company equity investment have had on the formation of large
holders over management and the fact that the latter would be more sensitive to market
effects.
88 Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo, "Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study
of public corporations with dual classes of common stock" (1985), 14 Journal of Financial
Economics 33; and, Gilson, supra, footnote 84.
89 Kenneth Lehn, Jeffrey Netter and Annette Poulsen, "Consolidating Corporate Control:
Dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts" (1990), 27 Journal of Financial
Economics 557.
90 Morek and Stangeland, supra, footnote 30.
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numbers of concentrated companies - a result that contradicts
Roe's emphasis on the regulatory structure of financial intermedi-
aries as a determinant of industrial structure. Nevertheless, our
work is preliminary in character, and we strongly endorse the need
for further research to explore these matters in a more systematic
fashion.
IV. THE MARKET AND DE-CONCENTRATION
Having recognized a number of possible causes for high levels of
corporate share ownership concentration in Canada, we now
discuss the existence of certain market and regulatory trends
eroding the impact of these factors, ultimately resulting in the de-
concentration or privatization of Canadian share ownership. We
first array the trends reducing concentration, and then consider
their impact on specific types of closely held companies.
1. Market and Regulatory Trends
For the last several decades, the level of effective protection
realized by Canadian industry has been steadily eroded through
liberalized trade policies, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the GAIT Uruguay Round. As measured by the
level of real trade flows, Canada is now one of the most open
economies of the world. This openness has intensified the product
market pressure on Canadian corporations, and has stimulated
the rationalization and restructuring of Canadian firms. 91
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of product market
pressures on specific firms, we believe that this discipline has
special import for closely held corporations given the long
standing suppression of other market mechanisms on managerial
behaviour. Perhaps most importantly, the liberalization of these
markets underscores the need for fragmented, small scale, multi-
product firms to narrow their corporate focus and to lower
production costs through the realization of scale economies. As
production is reorientated, we would predict two effects: (i) the
rationalization of foreign controlled Canadian subsidiaries in a
91 Like their foreign competitors, many Canadian suppliers have shed unnecessary hierar-
chicallayers and have increased the degree of product focus. The trend toward rational-
ization in response to trade liberalization is discussed in Richard G. Harris, Trade,
Industrial Policy and International Competition (Toronto, University of Toronto Press,
1985).
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continental market; and (ii) a corresponding increase in demand
for equity capital.
Accompanying the steady decline in trade protection instru-
ments has been the dismantling of many, though not all, foreign
investment restrictions.92 This trend is illustrated by the change in
the mandate of Investment Canada, from its original role as the
guardian for national control of domestic industry, to foreign
investment monitor, to its current role as foreign investment
promoter. 93 More lenient investment restrictions will likely
increase the depth of the Canadian capital market, while
permitting foreign owned corporations to determine whether or
not the partially owned subsidiary (particularly when it is confined
to producing goods and services for the Canadian market) is the
most efficient way to service the Canadian and perhaps conti-
nental market.
A further important regulatory change is the relaxation of the
foreign ownership rule for retirement funds to 20%. Although this
constraint still distorts Canadian capital flows, it expands
markedly the opportunity set for Canadian investors, and should
mitigate the market power of Canadian issuers, particularly in
terms of their ability to raise capital through restrictive equity
instruments. In fact, there have been a few recent instances in
which companies eliminated their non-voting shares and then
issued common shares since the market discount on a new
restricted voting share issue was too severe for the company to
accept.
2. Expected Impact of Trends on Concentrated Canadian
Corporations
In tandem, the changes we have enumerated can be expected to
accelerate the splintering or privatization of closely held public
companies, yielding significant efficiency gains for the Canadian
economy. We discuss the impact of these market changes in three
different closely held corporate contexts.
92 Certain "sensitive" Canadian industries like telecommunications remain subject to
foreign investment restrictions.
93 This transformation is discussed briefly in Lorraine Eden, "Multinationals as Agents of
Change: Setting a New Canadian Policy on Foreign Direct Investment", Industry
Canada Discussion Paper Number 1, November 1, pp. 15-17.
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(a) The Foreign Owned Subsidiary
Liberalization of trade and investment flows has led to the
privatization of a number of partially foreign-owned subsidiaries.
Since 1987, several high profile minority buyouts have been
consummated, including: Westinghouse Canada Inc (1987);
Nabisco Brands Ltd. (1988); elL Inc. (1988); General Electric
Canada Inc. (1990); Inglis Ltd. (1990); Campbell Soup Co. Ltd.
(1991); and Goodyear Canada Inc. (1993).94 The reason for these
buyouts is straightforward. In the absence of artificial entry
barriers, foreign corporations will be less inclined to establish or to
support subsidiaries designed to service the Canadian market,
especially when differences in the home and host country environ-
ments are relatively insignificant (implying that country or
location specific advantages from producing in the host country
were less important than artificial entry barriers in encouraging
the parent corporation to establish the subsidiary in the first
place).95 The savings from privatization of the partially-owned
subsidiary are significant, and include: enhanced organizational
efficiency from hierarchical de-layering, realization of economies
of scale from expanded production in the company's primary facil-
ities, and reduced filing, accounting, and legal costs related to
securities regulation for companies whose shares are traded in
public markets. We would expect these pressures would be felt
most acutely by widely held foreign parents whose product lines
are experiencing product market pressure and who are themselves
subject to intense capital market scrutiny in their home juris-
diction.
Despite these benefits, taking a partially-owned subsidiary
private has proven to be fairly difficult to realize in practice.
Majority buyouts are governed by stringent securities and
corporate law requirements. Ontario Securities Policy 9.1, for
instance, requires that an issuer proposing a going private trans-
action to obtain approval of a majority of minority shareholders
and to secure a valuation. 96 Further, issuers proposing such trans-
94 John Saunders, "Head office flexes its might", Globe and Mail, Tuesday, January 18,
1994, p. AI.
95 The theory of the multi-national enterprise is developed in Richard E. Caves,
Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1982). See also John Dunning, International Production and the Multi-
national Enterprise (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981) chapter 3; Alan Rugman,
Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets (London, Croom Helm,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1981).
96 Ontario Securities Policy 9.1, "Disclosure, Valuation, Review and Approval Require-
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actions are instructed to "consider and if reasonable to do so" to
adopt special committee review which contemplates disinterested
directorial review of the proposed transaction. In addition to the
procedural review requirements contemplated by securities law,
directors approving going private transactions are also subject to
corporate law fiduciary duties and to the oppression remedy.
Unfortunately, however, courts have not been consistent in the
way in which they have interpreted directorial responsibilities in a
going private transaction under these provisions. In Alexander v.
Westeel-Rosco Ltd., the court granted an interim injunction
against an amalgamation squeeze-out transaction on the basis that
the transaction discriminated against minority shareholders. 97
However, in other cases, the courts have permitted these transac-
tions to be implemented so long as the controlling shareholder
pays fair value to the minority.98
This line of cases has produced two significant problems for
directors in a going private transaction. First and foremost, the
decisions have created considerable uncertainty as how directors
should navigate among the shoals of conflicting judicial prece-
dents. Although strong arguments exist that amalgamation
squeeze-outs (especially when the majority are offering fair value
for the minority's shares) should not be deemed oppressive or
illegal per se, the jurisprudence is not clear on this point.99 These
problems are exacerbated when one considers the interaction of
the oppression remedy with securities law requirements, such as
Ontario Securities Policy 9.1. 100 Would, for instance, it still be
ments and Recommendations for Insider Bids, Issuer Bids, Going Private Transactions
and Related Party Transactions" (1991), 14 O.S.C.B. 3345. Insofar as going private
transactions are concerned, the policy closely tracks the approval regime prescribed in
the Ontario Business Corporations Act, s. 189.
97 (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 116,4 B.L.R. 313 (Ont. H.C.J.). Injunctions have been granted
in other cases involving amalgamation squeeze-outs on the basis that the proposed trans-
actions were oppressive. Ruskin v. Canada All-News Radio Ltd. (1979),7 B.L.R. 142
(Ont. H.C.J .); Burdon v. Zellers Ltd. (1981), 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. Sup. Ct).
98 See, for instance, Neonex International Ltd. v. Kolasa (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 446
(B.C.S.C.), and, General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada v. Lornex Mining Corp.
(1989),40 B.L.R. 299,66 O.R. (2d)783 (H.C.J.).
99 Despite apparent good faith conduct of the directors of an offering issuer, the courts may
enjoin these transactions on the basis that they are unfair or prejudicial to minority
shareholders.
100 The recent notice by the Director of the Canada Business Corporations Act (Policy
Statement 11.21, "Notice of Revised Policy on Going Private Transactions", dated
September 22, 1994) that going private transactions are permitted under the CBCA so
long as the substance of the transaction is not oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or
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open to minority shareholders to commence an oppression action
for a transaction that had been vetted and approved by directors
and minority shareholders pursuant to Policy 9.1?
Second, however, is the question of whether the securities and
corporate law regime in respect of going private transactions
confers excessive bargaining power on minority shareholders that
allows them to hold up value maximizing transactions on the
grounds that fair value has not been offered for their shares. JOJ
Given the size of the required premium necessary to take these
companies private, many majority shareholders have simply
refrained from privatizing these corporations, despite the clear
efficiency gains to be realized. And although it is arguable that
some· degree of rationalization of North American operations
could be achieved while maintaining the partially-owned
subsidiary (ie., by changing the multi-product character of
production for the Canadian market in the subsidiary's plant(s) to
single product production for the continental market), aggrieved
minority shareholders may, in fact, argue that these changes
constitute a breach of their original investment expectations and,
as such, are actionable under the oppression remedy.102 Indeed
this was the essence of a recent claim made by minority share-
holder GSW (20%) in a dispute with the majority shareholder in
Cameo, General Electric Canada (51 %). GSW argued that GE
owed a duty to the minority shareholders to keep Cameo in
unfairly disregards the interests of a person whose interest in a participating security is
being terminated without his or her consent is a step in the direction of ameliorating the
uncertainty that exists in respect of the interaction of corporate and securities law. The
policy statement provides that "in the case of offering corporations, compliance with
established indicia of fairness will, as a general rule, be viewed by the Director as suffi-
cient". Nevertheless, the Director's position is not dispositive of the validity of the
transaction under corporate law; that is a matter remitted to the courts. And, as the
Policy Statement indicates, the case law "does not offer definitive direction". Thus, in
the absence of judicial clarification, considerable uncertainty still exists.
10\ This concern is more than academic. In the recent privatization of Goodyear Canada,
the company first offered a premium that was 22% over market value, and minority
shareholders refused the offer. One year later, the company revised its offer to 67%
over the pre-transaction market price of the shares, which the shareholders accepted.
The difficulties surrounding the privatization of foreign owned subsidiaries are
discussed in a proactive article by John Kazanjian, "Problems in Governance: Dealing
with Canadian Minority Shareholders in an Integrating North American Business
Environment" (1994), 2:2 North American Corporate Lawyer 58.
102 Shifting production activity, however, does not enable the parent company to realize the
economies from more streamlined organizational structures nor of reduced transactions
costs that would accompany the elimination of public shareholders.
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business as a manufacturer, with long-term purchase commit-
ments from GE, instead of moving toward Camco becoming a
mere Canadian distributorship for GE products. 103 While the issue
of what the minority is actually entitled to on a going private trans-
action is complex, we would argue that the driving force behind
the privatization of these companies has generally been the desire
to undertake economically beneficial restructuring and rational-
ization stimulated by the liberalization of trade protection policy
in Canada and the United States, not malign shareholder redistri-
bution. Viewed in this frame, it is not obvious as between diver-
sified parent and subsidiary shareholders who should bear the
risks of a secular change in government trade policy that renders
the Canadian subsidiary structure uneconomic. If so, it may be
worth considering modifications to the substantive and procedural
rights of minority shareholders under the securities and corporate
law regime which would limit their capacity to hold parent
companies to ransom, particularly when the quest for these gains
will retard the timely rationalization of dysfunctional organiza-
tional structures.
(b) The Subsidiary of a Widely Held Canadian Company or
Conglomerate
Like its foreign counterpart, we predict that widely held multi-
division Canadian companies will also experience increased
pressure to de-concentrate through spin-offs or sell-offs of
controlled subsidiaries. These subsidiaries can either be wholly
owned or majority owned with publicly traded minority positions.
De-concentration can refer either to the creation of a new widely
held company or the sale of a control position in the subsidiary. In
both cases there will be an increase in the number of widely held
companies in the capital market but only in the former will a new
company be created.
Concerns have been expressed about the impact on shareholder
value of the existence of subsidiary operations in areas distinct
from the focus of the parent corporation. These concerns relate to
103 The claim was settled out of court. See Scott Feschuk, "GE sued by GSW to live up to
deal: Cameo's survival feared in jeopardy", July 14, 1992, Globe and Mail, p. B1; "GE
files claim to end GSW pact", Sept. 29, 1992, Globe and Mail, p. B5; "Cameo dispute
ends at court's door", Sept. 14, 1993, Globe and Mail, p. Bl1.
HeinOnline -- 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 52 1996
52 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 26
the low ownership levels of management and hence the agency
costs of equity and the use of the conglomerate structure as an
internal capital market which insulates the parent company from
capital market discipline through review when new funds are
sought. Typically conglomerate firms generate large cash flows
and, without strong monitoring by investors, these cash flows can
be spent on non-shareholder value increasing investments such as
the acquisition of subsidiaries in unrelated fields. The conglom-
erate structure can be motivated by inefficient financial or product
market diversification objectives. A good example of this
phenomenon is the formation and restructuring of Bell Canada
Enterprises (BeE), Canada's largest corporation. 104
Pressures for restructuring of these firms will emanate from
both capital and product markets. On the capital market side,
institutional investors will agitate for voluntary restructuring by
the firm to enhance shareholder value. Where possible, takeover
bids for the firm will be made which have as their main goal the
sale of some of the subsidiaries of the firm to achieve greater
focus, for example, the recent takeover bid for Labatt by Onex.
On the product market side, pressure may result from poor perfor-
mance of one or more subsidiaries of the firm which causes
management to remove the subsidiary from the overall structure.
The actual choice of a spin-off or sell-off will depend upon tax
considerations. In the former transaction, the shares of the
subsidiary are typically issued to shareholders of the conglomerate
as a dividend; this results in a new publicly traded company. In the
sell-off, the subsidiary can be acquired either as a management
buyout or an acquisition by another firm; in this situation
ownership concentration is unaffected.
Unfortunately not all changes in ownership structure will
positively effect management behaviour. For example, there are
instances where a company has acquired a significant but non-
controlling position in the equity of a firm as a portfolio
investment. For example, a company may own 15% to 20% of the
equity of another company and under most definitions the latter
company would not be defined as widely held. Recently, due to a
104 P. Halpern and V. Jog, "Bell Canada Enterprises: Wealth Creation or Destruction?"
forthcoming in R. Daniels and R. Morek, eds., Corporate Decisionmaking in Canada
(Calgary, Univ. of Cal. Press, 1995). However, for a more agnostic view of the conglom-
erate structure, see R. Daniels, R. Morek, and D. Stangeland, "In High Gear: A Case
Study ofthe Hees-EdperCorporate Group" in Daniels and Morek, op. cit.
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number of factors, including the need for funds to pay down debt
to finance investments or to improve strategic focus, these
portfolio positions have been liquidated and as long as the
portfolio investment is not purchased as a block by another firm or
investor, the company will be defined as widely held. With a
number of these transactions occurring in the Canadian capital
market, the TSE 300 appears less concentrated currently than it has
in previous years. I05 However, to the extent that these non-
controlling portfolio positions previously have little or no impact
on decision making, the observed change in concentration may
overstate the potential impact on managerial behaviour.
(c) The Individual or Family Controlled Company
While various market pressures will operate to accelerate the
privatization or de-concentration of closely held subsidiaries of
foreign or domestic widely held companies, we suspect that the
pace of transformation for companies which are under tight
individual or family control will be much more sluggish. The
slower pace of transformation of these firms can be attributed to
two principal factors. The first relates to the suppression of various
market mechanisms that alert shareholders and management to
the existence of corporate performance problems (e.g., capital,
control, and management markets), leaving shareholders and
managers dependent on product market discipline which, unfortu-
nately, occurs too late to permit any corrective action. 106 Given
positive bankruptcy costs, late stage discipline has particularly
105 Riedl and Mackenzie, "Broader Canadian Ownership Puts Greater Focus on Corporate
Governance" (1993), 5:2 Corporate Governance Review 4. The sellers of blocks of
shares have been foreign parent firms, Canadian families in conglomerate firms, and
portfolio holdings by firms. Riedl and Mackenzie observed that over the six-month
period ending in February 1994, controlling shareholders have distributed shares
broadly to both institutional and individual shareholders. Defining a company as widely
held when no one person or group owns over 20% of the shares or votes for dual class
shares, 25% of the firms on the TSE 300 and 60% of the firms on the TSE 35 were widely
held in February 1994. However, this cutoff defining widely held is still high and
companies defined as widely held may in fact be effectively controlled by an inside
group. In addition, the data are not presented to identify whether dual class shares have
become widely held. Since it defeats its purpose, it is unlikely that the controlling share-
holders ofthe voting shares have sold off their blocks.
106 The problem is that product market discipline usually triggers financial distress, a
situation that heightens incentives for opportunistic risk-taking by managers and which
requires tight creditor control of managerial decision-making, that limits the scope for
creative managerial action.
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disturbing implications for the efficiency of the Canadian
economy.
The second reason for sluggish transformation relates to the
existence of dual class share structures. While the motivation for
these structures is now primarily a matter of interest to economic
historians, we are interested in the feasibility of unwinding these
structures in response to various market pressures. 107 To be sure,
restructuring the share capital of a dual class company to a single
class of voting shares would in most instances reduce share
o.wnership concentration and result in larger institutional block
holdings since these investors are major holders of the restricted
voting shares. Nevertheless, there have been very few instances
where this restructuring occurred in Canada. 108
There are two reasons why dual class structures have proven so
resilient. First, with the use of the restricted voting shares to
finance growth, converting the restricted to superior voting shares
is likely to alter the ownership control of the initial major share-
holder. To the extent that the initial majority owner used the dual
class structure to 'cash out' by selling his or her restricted voting
shares, the ownership proportion and potential control position
could be severely diluted by the rearrangement of the share
structure. Moreover, with the large holdings of non-voting shares
by institutional investors, under the rearranged share structure
there would be large blocks of voting shares held by institutions.
To the extent that these investors are becoming more active in
corporate governance issues, the management of the company will
no longer be in a position of unquestioned control. 109
107 As we discussed earlier, we are sceptical that the adoption of these structures by many
Canadian companies was motivated primarily by efficiency objectives. But even if these
structures were put in place to support expansion in rapidly growing industries (the
Gilson efficient selection process), the maturing of these firms raises doubts about their
ongoing rationale. In fact it may be the need to raise new equity and the concomitant
discount on the non-voting shares which are to be issued that may lead growing firms to
eliminate their non-voting share structures.
108 From 1989 to 1994, there have been seven companies that undertook this restructuring:
four introduced poison pills in an attempt to limit the scope for control market disci-
pline; two had control positions in both the superior and restricted voting shares and
hence would not have their control position affected under the single class structure; and
the final company converted to single class since the dual class share structure was intro-
duced to finance short-term growth and had a sunset provision.
109 We note that although companies eliminating dual class share structures may adopt a
poison pill, the pill is not as effective an entrenchment mechanism as the dual class share
structure since there are mechanisms by which the pill can ultimately be rendered
ineffective. This is particularly relevant in light of two recent decisions rendered by the
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Second, as noted in all research in this area, the superior voting
shares sell at a premium to the restricted voting shares. Investors
who purchased the superior voting shares will oppose the restruc-
turing since they expect that there will be a loss in their wealth as
the share price of the superior voting shares falls after the restruc-
turing. However, superior voting share prices need not necessarily
fall in response to an elimination of dual class voting structures. To
the extent that this share structure facilitated entrenchment
behaviour and did not permit effective monitoring, then a restruc-
turing which would ameliorate these issues could in fact result in
an increase in share price. IIO Thus opposition by superior voting
shareholders to any restructuring should be based upon the expec-
tation of resulting changes in monitoring and alignment of incen-
tives of management to other shareholders.
In summary, any change to a single voting share class must be of
net benefit to the control block - particularly in the case of
individual or family controlled firms. However, to be successful,
the net benefit offered will have to match, and most likely
probably have to exceed, the present value of the expected future
stream of private pecuniary benefits associated with. control in
light of the endowment, income, and non-pecuniary benefit
effects discussed earlier. That is not to say that there are no costs
to the controlling blockholder from dual class share structures.
These costs include lower share prices due to agency and
entrenchment costs, a higher cost of capital due to lower prices on
non-voting shares, reduced liquidity, and, in some cases, a higher
dividend paid on the non-voting (inferior voting) shares. III The
Ontario Securities Commission which appear to limit the ability of management to "just
say no" to a takeover bid: In the Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter S.5,
as amended and In the Matter of MDC Corporation and Regal Greetings & Gifts Inc.
(1994), 17 O.S.C.B. 4971; and In the Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter
S.5, as amended and In the Matter of Lac Minerals Ltd. and Royal Oak Mines Inc.
(1994),17 O.S.C.B. 4963.
110 With the introduction of dual class shares, there is an overall loss of wealth as
documented by Jog and Riding, supra, footnote 85, which reflects the agency costs of
equity when the voting shareholders control the firm and have a small proportion of the
equity. If the restructuring eliminates the agency cost, then the overall value of the
equity of the firm will rise and although the two classes of shares will have the same
price, it will be at a higher value.
III The higher cost of capital and resulting dilution in the event of a new issue of non-voting
shares will be a cost to the control group, but once again they only bear a proportion of
the total dilution cost. Ultimately, the strongest motivation to move to the single share
class may be the desire of the controlling shareholder to sell the company and this may
be easier to achieve when there is one class of shares.
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only point is that these costs will have to be significant before they
exceed the private benefits from control which are biased
upwards.
V. STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING THE DECONCENTRATION OR
PRIVATIZATION OF CLOSHY HELD INDIVIDUAL OR FAMILY
CORPORATIONS
A central theme of this article is that ownership structure
matters when it comes to ensuring managerial accountability in
the modern corporation. Whereas commentators in the United
States have focused on the agency problems found in widely held
corporations, the accountability problems in closely held public
corporations may be equally severe, and merit close attention.
These latter problems are of special interest to policy-makers in
Canada given the traditional domination of the closely held corpo-
ration in the Canadian economy. While the data show that widely
held corporations containing several large blockholders may, on
average, maximize the value of the firm, we refrain from urging
the adoption of policies that aim to thrust a standard template of
share ownership on the Canadian corporation. After all, the
corporation's status as a core institution of modern capitalism is
based on its inherent flexibility and adaptability. Although it may
be true that firm value is on average maximized through diffuse
large stakes ownership, the measure neglects the value of firm
structures that deviate from the mean. As long as the scope for
artificial regulatory constraints to be imposed on corporations is
constrained, we believe that shareholders are likely to prove
themselves remarkably adept in adjusting to, and drawing on the
benefits of, alternative ownership structures. We would no sooner
subject all Canadian public corporations to one form of ownership
(even if it were possible) than we would to one standard marketing
or distribution strategy. 112
Given our agnosticism on the issue of what constitutes an
optimal ownership structure for the Canadian corporation, the
question then is what, if any, policy prescriptions fall from our
study? While ambivalent about ownership per se, we are less so
J 12 This is especially so when the life cycle of the firm is taken into consideration. Simply
put, more concentrated ownership structures may have greater economic force in the
corporation's early stage of development. but the role for these structures may diminish
as the corporation grows in size and complexity.
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about the governmental policy distortions that have systematically
skewed Canadian corporate structure towards an artificially
excessive reliance on the closely held public corporation. In this
respect, the first policy prescription is one of vigorous and accel-
erated market liberalization. As noted earlier, product and capital
markets have been opened considerably by several recent
reforms, and this opening has had a salutary effect on the structure
and performance of many Canadian corporations. Nevertheless,
several distortions still remain, and command close attention by
policy-makers. Of these, perhaps the most important is the
continued existence of the foreign property rule and the sundry
entry restrictions that still operate on financial and market
intermediaries wishing to enter the Canadian market. In this
respect, we strongly endorse the value of open and vibrant capital
and product markets as the preferred means for ensuring rational
organizational choice.
However, while we are confident that market pressures will
promote organizational vitality and efficiency, we remain
concerned with the prospects for efficient organizational
adjustment in the context ofthe closely held family or individually
controlled firm. It is here that government barriers on investment
outflows had their most pernicious effects by allowing controlling
shareholders to solidify their control position through the creation
of dual class share structures. With these capital structures in
place, controlling shareholders were able to reduce their
economic investment in the firm without affecting their ability to
wrest private benefits from control. In this respect, the effect of
dual class share structures was profound; by facilitating capital
disinvestment, the private costs to equity holders of control were
reduced, while the private benefits that could be extracted from
control were unchanged. We believe that these problems are most
severe in settings where the income, endowment, and non-
pecuniary benefit effects discussed above are likely to be salient-
the family or individually controlled firm, where control resides
with aging entrepreneurs or second generation heirs.
Unfortunately, it is far easier to identify the problem of the
closely held family firm than it is to implement nuanced and
effective strategies to rectify the problem. On the basis of both
efficiency and equity criteria, Morck endorses the adoption of an
inheritance tax that is designed to make inter-generational control
transfers more difficult to effect. 113 The difficulty, however, is that
113 Randall Morek, "On the Economics of Concentrated Ownership", post, p. 63-RS.
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these taxes are enormously easy to evade. 114 In this vein, it is worth
recalling that the federal government did impose a tax on inheri-
tances in the period from 1941 to 1971, but abandoned the tax
because of its high administrative costs and low revenue yield. liS
In light of the infirmities surrounding inheritance taxes, what
other options remain? One alternative is to adopt regulatory
prohibitions on dual class voting structures or to require the
insertion of sunset provisions which require a shareholder vote to
continue the dual class structure. Another option is a tax on
ownership structure that would vary in accordance with the
proportion of voting stock held by large block shareholder groups.
Alternatively, securities regulators could raise the costs of control
transfers by limiting access to the private agreement exemption. 116
The last two options are designed to reduce the formation of
control blocks by increasing the costs of either holding or trans-
ferring control.
Nevertheless, all of these instruments suffer from a lack of
nuance. An outright prohibition on dual class shares would deter
the use of restricted voting shares in circumstances and on terms
that are Pareto efficient. The same claim could be made in relation
to progressive capital taxes. Our determination to accelerate the
transformation of such poorly performing family controlled
companies such as Birks, Peoples Jewellers and Dylex, before the
product market discipline imposes costs though financial distress,
should not adversely affect such proven performers as Power
Corp.
Different concerns are raised in respect of restrictions on
Morck notes that Canada is one of the few industrialized countries to lack an inheritance
tax. However, he ignores the fact that death is a deemed disposition under the Income
Tax Act, and therefore subjects the deceased's assets to capital gains treatment.
114 Jonathan Kesselman, "Improving Tax Fairness" in Allan Maslove, ed., Issues in the
Taxation of Individuals (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 80-1. In the
same volume, James Davies and David Duff in "Wealth Tax Proposals: Distributional
Impacts and Revenue Potential" at pp. 187-88, assemble data which show that revenue
from wealth transfer taxes has steadily declined from the period 1970 to 1980 (from .92
to .43% of total tax revenue), but then increased slightly in the period 1980 to 1990 (to
.52% of total tax revenue).
115 Davies and Duff, ibid.
116 The private agreement exemption is set out in s. 93( 1)(c) of the Ontario Securities Act.
It permits controlling shareholders to sell their control blocks to five or fewer purchasers
so long as the value of consideration does not exceed 115% of the base market price. In
the absence of such an exemption, controlling shareholders are subject to an equal
opportunity rule which requires that any premia from control be distributed pro rata
among all shareholders of the same class of shares.
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control block alienability. While it is true that such restrictions
might deter the acquisition of such blocks, they may also have the
perverse effect of encouraging inefficient control block holders to
retain their shares in order to wrest the maximum personal value
from the firm. If shareholders are required to share the control
premium (which reflects the capitalized value of future private
benefits) on disposition, they will seek to retain control for as long
as possible so as to fully appropriate the private benefits. I I?
Given the bluntness of these instruments, we suggest an alter-
native strategy for dealing with concentration that is based on an
enhanced role for the board of directors. As mentioned above, the
board of directors in the closely held corporation is often viewed
as imposing little real constraint on the conduct of inside share-
holders. But given the suppression of market instruments in the
closely held corporation, we would regard the board's monitoring
role, particularly the outside directors', as more rather than less
important than in widely held companies. The goal is to align
inside and outside shareholder interests through effective
monitoring and the discipline of agency costs. Through active
vigilance, the board could constrain the appropriation of share-
holder wealth by inside shareholders through bloated compen-
sation, un-bargained for and unfair self-dealing transactions, and
ill-conceived executive succession strategies. After all, in
comparison to outside shareholders, the board has both the access
to real time firm specific information and the clout to constrain
shareholder opportunism.
This recommendation is founded on the success of the private
corporation in which management has a major equity stake and
the other shareholders and suppliers of risky debt capital
undertake in depth monitoring to ensure that shareholder and
manager interests are aligned. In the closely held company,
monitoring by shareholders is not sufficient due to their small
numb~rs and it is left to the board of directors to provide this
overview.
Recently, the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on
Corporate Governance in Canada (the "Dey Report") proposed
117 The incentive effects of a more restrictive equal opportunity rule on the inclination to
assemble a control block in the first place is more ambiguous. An acquiror may refrain
from assembling the block because of restrictions on subsequent alienability. On the
other hand, if significant control benefits can be wrested pre-disposition, then the
restriction might have only a modest incentive effect.
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the adoption of guidelines for board behaviour and composition
that would, among other things, require a majority of directors of
the board to be unrelated to management, but, for the purposes of
the guidelines, unrelated directors were defined to include
directors related to substantial shareholders. liS While we believe
that the institutional environment in which directors operate can
enhance the integrity of corporate decision-making, ultimately we
believe that frailties in the boardroom require greater attention to
the role that markets can play in bolstering the board's central
function. 1I9 Essentially, it is our belief that vibrant and efficient
118 "Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in
Canada", Report of the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Gover-
nance in Canada, December, 1994. One of us - Daniels - was a member of the TSE
Committee. In its interim report, the Committee had recommended that a majority of
directors be unrelated to either management or to substantial shareholders. In light of
public comments received expressing concern with sterilizing the controlling share-
holders' capacity to control the corporation, the Committee relaxed that component of
its recommendation. Nevertheless, despite the Committee's retreat on its earlier struc-
tural recommendation, it continued to emphasize the legal duty of all directors to
exercise independent judgment irrespective of their relationships to the company or the
shareholders.
119 The widespread concern is that the dynamics of the board as a group will subvert the
capacity of individual directors to go against the wishes of managers or controlling
shareholders who are engaging in opportunistic behaviour. The psychological literature
on groups validates these concerns. Group psychology is concerned with understanding
"how individuals are influenced by the groups to which they belong or with whom they
are involved, and how these groups are in turn influenced by their members"; see P.
Paulus, "An Overview and Evaluation of Group Influence", in P. Paulus, ed.,
Psychology ofGroup Influence (Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1989), chapter 1, p. 1. Commonly, it is assumed that group discussion allows problems
to be solved more effectively than could an individual working alone. The diversity of
perspectives and expertise within groups, as well as opportunities for probing discussion
and analysis, are implicated. Nevertheless, numerous studies of group behaviour reveal
defects in the group's capacity to solve complex problems. First, contrary to conven-
tional views, group discussion often fails to tease out diverse perspectives on complex
problems. Typically, group members tend to discuss information which is common to
all, while withholding information that is unique. (Garold Stasser, "Pooling of
Unshared Information" in Stephen Worchel, Wendy Wood and Jeffrey Simpson, eds.,
Group Process and Productivity, (Newbury California Sage, 1992), chapter 2. See also
Stasser and Taylor and Hanna, "Information Sampling in Structured Discussions of
Three and Six Person Groups" (1989), 57 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
67; Stasser and Titus, "Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making:
Biased Information Sampling During Group Discussion" (1985),48 Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 1467. And, even if revealed, this information tends to be
heavily discounted by the group. The tendency of groups to focus on shared information
at the expense of unshared information is particularly disconcerting when the unique
information has significant value for the problem under consideration. Further exacer-
bating the difficulties for group resolution of complex problems is the pervasive problem
of groupthink. (The term is attributable to I.L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston.
HeinOnline -- 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 61 1996
1995-96] Corporate Governance in Transition 61
markets are a far more effective means for ensuring board effec-
tiveness than the range of structural modifications that have so far
dominated the corporate governance agenda.
There are a number of ways in which markets can be made to
operate more effectively in the system of corporate governance.
Enhanced (though cost-effective) disclosure of information to
market participants is one obvious mechanism for improving
market performance. In this respect, we endorse the amendments
to the executive compensation disclosure regulations adopted by
the Ontario government that mandate augmented disclosure both
of the nature and level of individual compensation earned by
senior managers and of the board processes used to produce these
compensation packages. 120 We also support efforts to improve the
operation of the continuous disclosure system - though we
caution against the adoption of measures which invite irrespon-
sible and essentially frivolous shareholder suits frequently
observed in the United States. 12l However, in a setting where
sundry legal barriers have arguably impeded the ability of institu-
tional investors to exercise measured voice, we worry that reforms
Houghton Mifflin, 1972).) The more difficult the task confronted by the group, the
stronger the consensus within the group, the more value that individual members derive
from group membership, the less likely it is that individuals will deviate from majority
views, even if those views do not accord with the individual's personal viewpoint. See
S.E. Asch "Opinions and Social Pressure" (1955), 193 Scientific American 31; L.
Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes" (1954),7 Human Relations 117.
Research shows that conformity pressures can operate on outsiders, ·although the
individual status, intensity of commitment to initial positions, and degree of expertise
mitigate the pressures for conformity. A third and related problem for groups is the
tendency of group membership to diffuse individual responsibility for collectively made
decisions. See discussion in R. Baron, N. Kerr, and N. Miller, Group Process, Group
Decision, and Group Action (Buckingham, Open University Press, 1992), chapters 3
and 4. The spectre for these problems increases with the size of the group. Diffused
responsibility causes two main problems for groups: (i) the reduction of average product
of the group through shirking; and, (ii) the creation of group shift or polarization
problems that make individual and group opinions more extreme relative to their pre-
discussion values (typically along the risk dimension).
120 Regulation to Amend Regulation 1015 of the revised regulations of Ontario, 1990 Made
Under the Securities Act (October 13, 1993). The changes to the regulation are
discussed in Ronald Daniels, "Executive Compensation: Perhaps Company Managers
Aren't Paid Enough..." (1994),7 Canadian Investment Review 41.
121 Roberta Romano's work on the limited efficacy of the shareholder suit, 'The Share-
holder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?" (1991) 7 Journal of Law, Economics &
Organization 55; and Joseph Grundfest's recent reforms designed to limit access to the
derivative suit, "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority (Securities and Exchange Commission)" (1994),
I07 Harvard Law Review 961.
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aimed at enhancing the dissemination of timely and accurate infor-
mation to the market are not enough. 122 Here, we would favour
greater legislative attention to some of the more egregious and ilI-
founded constraints hobbling responsible institutional voice, but,
as a quid pro quo for relaxation of these barriers, advocate
enhanced transparency both of the beneficial level of investment
held by Canadian institutions in downstream companies and of
any significant forms of activism taken in relation to these invest-
ments.
These policy prescriptions to address the continuing problem of
the closely held corporation, especially in the context of dual class
share structures, are by design muted. Intervention in the
operation of markets and in the ownership structures of corpora-
tions can lead to severe distortions. In fact, we argue for the elimi-
nation of those regulatory restrictions that currently exist. We
believe in the vibrancy of capital, product, and takeover markets
to resolve many of the problems associated with agency costs and
poor alignment of shareholder and manager incentives. Changes
in operations and structures of companies have occurred with the
opening of capital markets and the liberalization of trade. In the
closely held corporation, including dual class shares, we not only
rely on the discipline of the product market but also endorse
effective monitoring by institutions and the boards of directors.
122 For a discussion of the legal and organizational barriers impacting Canadian institu-
tional investors, see Ronald Daniels and Edward Waitzer, "Challenges to the Citadel:
A Brief Overview of Recent Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance" (1994), 23
C.B.L.J. 23; and, R. Daniels and J. Macintosh, supra, footnote 3.
